I suppose there might be one thing that at least enabled him to draw such an inference that would not be true with me or many others:  that is, because he looks upon all this matter of slavery as an exceedingly little thing,—­this matter of keeping one sixth of the population of the whole nation in a state of oppression and tyranny unequaled in the world.  He looks upon it as being an exceedingly little thing,—­only equal to the question of the cranberry laws of Indiana; as something having no moral question in it; as something on a par with the question of whether a man shall pasture his land with cattle, or plant it with tobacco; so little and so small a thing that he concludes, if I could desire that anything should be done to bring about the ultimate extinction of that little thing, I must be in favor of bringing about an amalgamation of all the other little things in the Union.  Now, it so happens—­and there, I presume, is the foundation of this mistake—­that the Judge thinks thus; and it so happens that there is a vast portion of the American people that do not look upon that matter as being this very little thing.  They look upon it as a vast moral evil; they can prove it as such by the writings of those who gave us the blessings of liberty which we enjoy, and that they so looked upon it, and not as an evil merely confining itself to the States where it is situated; and while we agree that, by the Constitution we assented to, in the States where it exists, we have no right to interfere with it, because it is in the Constitution; and we are by both duty and inclination to stick by that Constitution, in all its letter and spirit, from beginning to end,

So much, then, as to my disposition—­my wish to have all the State legislatures blotted out, and to have one consolidated government, and a uniformity of domestic regulations in all the States, by which I suppose it is meant, if we raise corn here, we must make sugar-cane grow here too, and we must make those which grow North grow in the South.  All this I suppose he understands I am in favor of doing.  Now, so much for all this nonsense; for I must call it so.  The Judge can have no issue with me on a question of establishing uniformity in the domestic regulations of the States.

A little now on the other point,—­the Dred Scott decision.  Another of the issues he says that is to be made with me is upon his devotion to the Dred Scott decision, and my opposition to it.

I have expressed heretofore, and I now repeat, my opposition to the Dred Scott decision; but I should be allowed to state the nature of that opposition, and I ask your indulgence while I do so.  What is fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used, “resistance to the decision”?  I do not resist it.  If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property, and that terrible difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of interfering with property, would arise.  But I am doing no such thing as that, but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule.  If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory, in spite of the Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should.