first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges.  A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying:  But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given.  Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England.  “If a man,” saith he, “that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties.  For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight.”  Here you see, An Innocent Man, Judicially Acquitted, Notwithstanding His Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, Upon A Presumption In Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath.  If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall:  if the presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods?  This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the Judges.  It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law.  For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice:  for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow.  There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents:  but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them.  For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation.  And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the some manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements.  For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Soveraigne.