In order to maintain the notion of a general and intended progress, it is not necessary to show that no preceding age has excelled ours in some special, development.  Phidias has had no rival in sculpture, we may admit.  It is possible that glass was once made as flexible as leather, and that copper could be hardened like steel.  But I do not take much stock in the “lost arts,” the wondering theme of the lyceums.  The knowledge of the natural world, and of materials, was never, I believe, so extensive and exact as it is today.  It is possible that there are tricks of chemistry, ingenious processes, secrets of color, of which we are ignorant; but I do not believe there was ever an ancient alchemist who could not be taught something in a modern laboratory.  The vast engineering works of the ancient Egyptians, the remains of their temples and pyramids, excite our wonder; but I have no doubt that President Grant, if he becomes the tyrant they say he is becoming, and commands the labor of forty millions of slaves—­a large proportion of them office —­holders—­could build a Karnak, or erect a string of pyramids across New Jersey.

Mr. Froude runs lightly over a list of subjects upon which the believer in progress relies for his belief, and then says of them that the world calls this progress—­he calls it only change.  I suppose he means by this two things:  that these great movements of our modern life are not any evidence of a permanent advance, and that our whole structure may tumble into a heap of incoherent sand, as systems of society have done before; and, again, that it is questionable if, in what we call a stride in civilization, the individual citizen is becoming any purer or more just, or if his intelligence is directed towards learning and doing what is right, or only to the means of more extended pleasures.

It is, perhaps, idle to speculate upon the first of these points—­the permanence of our advance, if it is an advance.  But we may be encouraged by one thing that distinguishes this period—­say from the middle of the eighteenth century—­from any that has preceded it.  I mean the introduction of machinery, applied to the multiplication of man’s power in a hundred directions—­to manufacturing, to locomotion, to the diffusion of thought and of knowledge.  I need not dwell upon this familiar topic.  Since this period began there has been, so far as I know, no retrograde movement anywhere, but, besides the material, an intellectual and spiritual kindling the world over, for which history has no sort of parallel.  Truth is always the same, and will make its way, but this subject might be illustrated by a study of the relation of Christianity and of the brotherhood of men to machinery.  The theme would demand an essay by itself.  I leave it with the one remark, that this great change now being wrought in the world by the multiplicity of machinery is not more a material than it is an intellectual one, and that we have no instance in history of a catastrophe widespread enough and adequate to sweep away its results.  That is to say, none of the catastrophes, not even the corruptions, which brought to ruin the ancient civilizations, would work anything like the same disaster in an age which has the use of machinery that this age has.