An imperial policy does not necessarily imply such vagaries as the forcible detention of the forcibly annexed Boer republic.  But everybody sees that the time is near when England must say definitely as to the imperial policy generally whether it will pursue it or abandon it.  And it may be remarked in passing that the Gladstone government, thus far, though pursuing this policy more moderately than the Beaconsfield government, shows no intention of abandoning it.  Almost everybody admits that if it is abandoned England must sink to the position of a third-rate power like Holland.  For what does abandonment mean?  It means to have no weight, except that of moral example, in Continental affairs:  to relinquish her advantages in the Mediterranean; to let Turkey be absorbed by Russia; to become so weak in India as to risk rebellion of all the provinces, and probable attack from Russia and her Central Asian allies.  But this is not all.  Lost control in Asia is lost trade; this is evident in every foot of control Russia has gained in the Caucasus, about the Caspian Sea, in Persia.  There Russian manufactures supplant the English; and so in another quarter:  in order to enjoy the vast opening trade of Africa, England must be on hand with an exhibition of power.  We might show by a hundred examples that the imperial idea in England does not rest on pride alone, on national glory altogether, though that is a large element in it, but on trade instincts.  “Trade follows the flag” is a well-known motto; and that means that the lines of commerce follow the limits of empire.

Take India as an illustration.  Why should England care to keep India?  In the last forty years the total revenue from India, set down up to 1880 as L 1,517,000,000, has been L 53,000,000 less than the expenditure.  It varies with the years, and occasionally the balance is favorable, as in 1879, when the expenditure was L 63,400,000 and the revenue was L 64,400,000.  But to offset this average deficit the very profitable trade of India, which is mostly in British hands, swells the national wealth; and this trade would not be so largely in British hands if the flag were away.

But this is not the only value of India.  Grasp on India is part of the vast Oriental network of English trade and commerce, the carrying trade, the supply of cotton and iron goods.  This largely depends upon English prestige in the Orient, and to lose India is to lose the grip.  On practically the same string with India are Egypt, Central Africa, and the Euphrates valley.  A vast empire of trade opens out.  To sink the imperial policy is to shut this vision.  With Russia pressing on one side and America competing on the other, England cannot afford to lose her military lines, her control of the sea, her prestige.