those tactics of the surprise and the ambuscade in
which the Boers excelled. And yet the column
still plodded aimlessly on in its dense formation,
and if there were any attempt at scouting ahead and
on the flanks the result showed how ineffectively
it was carried out. It was at a quarter past
four in the clear light of a South African morning
that a shot, and then another, and then a rolling
crash of musketry, told that we were to have one more
rough lesson of the result of neglecting the usual
precautions of warfare. High up on the face of
a steep line of hill the Boer riflemen lay hid, and
from a short range their fire scourged our exposed
flank. The men appear to have been chiefly colonial
rebels, and not Boers of the backveld, and to that
happy chance it may be that the comparative harmlessness
of their fire was due. Even now, in spite of
the surprise, the situation might have been saved
had the bewildered troops and their harried officers
known exactly what to do. It is easy to be wise
after the event, but it appears now that the only course
that could commend itself would be to extricate the
troops from their position, and then, if thought feasible,
to plan an attack. Instead of this a rush was
made at the hillside, and the infantry made their
way some distance up it only to find that there were
positive ledges in front of them which could not be
climbed. The advance was at a dead stop, and
the men lay down under the boulders for cover from
the hot fire which came from inaccessible marksmen
above them. Meanwhile the artillery had opened
behind them, and their fire (not for the first time
in this campaign) was more deadly to their friends
than to their foes. At least one prominent officer
fell among his men, torn by British shrapnel bullets.
Talana Hill and Modder River have shown also, though
perhaps in a less tragic degree, that what with the
long range of modern artillery fire, and what with
the difficulty of locating infantry who are using
smokeless powder, it is necessary that officers commanding
batteries should be provided with the coolest heads
and the most powerful glasses of any men in the service,
for a responsibility which will become more and more
terrific rests upon their judgment.
The question now, since the assault had failed, was
how to extricate the men from their position.
Many withdrew down the hill, running the gauntlet
of the enemy’s fire as they emerged from the
boulders on to the open ground, while others clung
to their positions, some from a soldierly hope that
victory might finally incline to them, others because
it was clearly safer to lie among the rocks than to
cross the bullet-swept spaces beyond. Those portions
of the force who extricated themselves do not appear
to have realised how many of their comrades had remained
behind, and so as the gap gradually increased between
the men who were stationary and the men who fell back
all hope of the two bodies reuniting became impossible.
All the infantry who remained upon the hillside were
captured. The rest rallied at a point fifteen
hundred yards from the scene of the surprise, and
began an orderly retreat to Molteno.