poorest of the burghers, who now, as in the middle ages, suffer most in battle, since a long purse means a good horse.  Most of the enemy galloped very comfortably away after the action, leaving a fringe of sharpshooters among the kopjes to hold back our pursuing cavalry.  The want of horsemen and the want of horse artillery are the two reasons which Lord Methuen gives why the defeat was not converted into a rout.  As it was, the feelings of the retreating Boers were exemplified by one of their number, who turned in his saddle in order to place his outstretched fingers to his nose in derision of the victors.  He exposed himself to the fire of half a battalion while doing so, but he probably was aware that with our present musketry instruction the fire of a British half-battalion against an individual is not a very serious matter.

The remainder of the 23rd was spent at Belmont Camp, and next morning an advance was made to Enslin, some ten miles further on.  Here lay the plain of Enslin, bounded by a formidable line of kopjes as dangerous as those of Belmont.  Lancers and Rimington’s Scouts, the feeble but very capable cavalry of the Army, came in with the report that the hills were strongly held.  Some more hard slogging was in front of the relievers of Kimberley.

The advance had been on the line of the Cape Town to Kimberley Railway, and the damage done to it by the Boers had been repaired to the extent of permitting an armoured train with a naval gun to accompany the troops.  It was six o’ clock upon the morning of Saturday the 25th that this gun came into action against the kopjes, closely followed by the guns of the field artillery.  One of the lessons of the war has been to disillusion us as to the effect of shrapnel fire.  Positions which had been made theoretically untenable have again and again been found to be most inconveniently tenanted.  Among the troops actually engaged the confidence in the effect of shrapnel fire has steadily declined with their experience.  Some other method of artillery fire than the curving bullet from an exploding shrapnel shell must be devised for dealing with men who lie close among boulders and behind cover.

These remarks upon shrapnel might be included in the account of half the battles of the war, but they are particularly apposite to the action at Enslin.  Here a single large kopje formed the key to the position, and a considerable time was expended upon preparing it for the British assault, by directing upon it a fire which swept the face of it and searched, as was hoped, every corner in which a rifleman might lurk.  One of the two batteries engaged fired no fewer than five hundred rounds.  Then the infantry advance was ordered, the Guards being held in reserve on account of their exertions at Belmont.  The Northumberlands, Northamptons, North Lancashires, and Yorkshires worked round upon the right, and, aided by the artillery fire, cleared the trenches in their front.  The