In the meantime we may follow the unhappy fortunes of the small column which had, as already described, been sent out by Sir George White in order, if possible, to prevent the junction of the two Boer armies, and at the same time to threaten the right wing of the main force, which was advancing from the direction of Dundee, Sir George White throughout the campaign consistently displayed one quality which is a charming one in an individual, but may be dangerous in a commander.  He was a confirmed optimist.  Perhaps his heart might have failed him in the dark days to come had he not been so.  But whether one considers the non-destruction of the Newcastle Railway, the acquiescence in the occupation of Dundee, the retention of the non combatants in Ladysmith until it was too late to get rid of their useless mouths, or the failure to make any serious preparations for the defence of the town until his troops were beaten back into it, we see always the same evidence of a man who habitually hopes that all will go well, and is in consequence remiss in making preparations for their going ill.  But unhappily in every one of these instances they did go ill, though the slowness of the Boers enabled us, both at Dundee and at Ladysmith, to escape what might have been disaster.

Sir George White has so nobly and frankly taken upon himself the blame of Nicholson’s Nek that an impartial historian must rather regard his self-condemnation as having been excessive.  The immediate causes of the failure were undoubtedly the results of pure ill-fortune, and depended on things outside his control.  But it is evident that the strategic plan which would justify the presence of this column at Nicholson’s Nek was based upon the supposition that the main army won their action at Lombard’s Kop.  In that case White might swing round his right and pin the Boers between himself and Nicholson’s Nek.  In any case he could then re-unite with his isolated wing.  But if he should lose his battle—­what then?  What was to become of this detachment five miles up in the air?  How was it to be extricated?  The gallant Irishman seems to have waved aside the very idea of defeat.  An assurance was, it is reported, given to the leaders of the column that by eleven o’clock next morning they would be relieved.  So they would if White had won his action.  But—­

The force chosen to operate independently consisted of four and a half companies of the Gloucester regiment, six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and No. 10 Mountain Battery of six seven-pounder screw-guns.  They were both old soldier regiments from India, and the Fusiliers had shown only ten days before at Talana Hill the stuff of which they were made.  Colonel Carleton, of the Fusiliers, to whose exertions much of the success of the retreat from Dundee was due, commanded the column, with Major Adye as staff officer.  On the night of Sunday, October 29th, they tramped out of Ladysmith, a thousand men, none better in the army.  Little they thought, as they exchanged a jest or two with the outlying pickets, that they were seeing the last of their own armed countrymen for many a weary month.