In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had befallen the isolated detachment of Canadians and 28th Mounted Infantry upon the extreme right.  Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian officer in command, behaved with the utmost gallantry, and was splendidly seconded by his men.  Overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, amid a perfect hail of bullets they fought like heroes to the end.  ’There have been few finer instances of heroism in the course of the campaign,’ says the reticent Kitchener in his official despatch.  Of the Canadians eighteen were hit out of twenty-one, and the Mounted Infantry hard by lost thirty out of forty-five before they surrendered.

This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to the Boers in breaking the British line.  The fact that it was so makes it the more difficult to understand why this outpost was so exposed.  The burghers had practically surrounded Cookson’s force, and De la Rey and Kemp urged on the attack; but their artillery fire was dominated by the British guns, and no weak point could be found in the defence.  At 1 o’clock the attack had been begun, and at 5.30 it was finally abandoned, and De la Rey was in full retreat.  That he was in no sense routed is shown by the fact that Cookson did not attempt to follow him up or to capture his guns; but at least he had failed in his purpose, and had lost more heavily than in any engagement which he had yet fought.  The moral effect of his previous victories had also been weakened, and his burghers had learned, if they had illusions upon the subject, that the men who fled at Tweebosch were not typical troopers of the British Army.  Altogether, it was a well-fought and useful action, though it cost the British force some two hundred casualties, of which thirty-five were fatal.  Cookson’s force stood to arms all night until the arrival of Walter Kitchener’s men in the morning.

General Ian Hamilton, who had acted for some time as Chief of the Staff to Lord Kitchener, had arrived on April 8th at Klerksdorp to take supreme command of the whole operations against De la Rey.  Early in April the three main British columns had made a rapid cast round without success.  To the very end the better intelligence and the higher mobility seem to have remained upon the side of the Boers, who could always force a fight when they wished and escape when they wished.  Occasionally, however, they forced one at the wrong time, as in the instance which I am about to describe.

Hamilton had planned a drive to cover the southern portion of De la Rey’s country, and for this purpose, with Hartebeestefontein for his centre, he was manoeuvring his columns so as to swing them into line and then sweep back towards Klerksdorp.  Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter Kitchener were all manoeuvring for this purpose.  The Boers, however, game to the last, although they were aware that their leaders had gone in to treat, and that peace was probably due