to one, made a stout resistance, and it was not until seven o’clock that the last shot was fired.  The result was a complete success to the burghers, but one which leaves no shadow of discredit on any officer or man among those who were engaged.  Eleven officers and 176 men fell out of about 550 actually engaged.  The two guns were taken.  The convoy was no use to the Boers, so the teams were shot and the wagons burned before they withdrew.  The prisoners too, they were unable to retain, and their sole permanent trophies consisted of the two guns, the rifles, and the ammunition.  Their own losses amounted to about fifty killed and wounded.

A small force sallied out from Klerksdorp in the hope of helping Anderson, but on reaching the Jagd Drift it was found that the fighting was over and that the field was in possession of the Boers.  De la Rey was seen in person among the burghers, and it is pleasant to add that he made himself conspicuous by his humanity to the wounded.  His force drew off in the course of the morning, and was soon out of reach of immediate pursuit, though this was attempted by Kekewich, Von Donop, and Grenfell.  It was important to regain the guns if possible, as they were always a menace to the blockhouse system, and for this purpose Grenfell with sixteen hundred horsemen was despatched to a point south of Lichtenburg, which was conjectured to be upon the Boer line of retreat.  At the same time Lord Methuen was ordered up from Vryburg in order to cooperate in this movement, and to join his forces to those of Grenfell.  It was obvious that with an energetic and resolute adversary like De la Rey there was great danger of these two forces being taken in detail, but it was hoped that each was strong enough to hold its own until the other could come to its aid.  The result was to show that the danger was real and the hope fallacious.

It was on March 2nd that Methuen left Vryburg.  The column was not his old one, consisting of veterans of the trek, but was the Kimberley column under Major Paris, a body of men who had seen much less service and were in every way less reliable.  It included a curious mixture of units, the most solid of which were four guns (two of the 4th, and two of the 38th R.F.A.), 200 Northumberland Fusiliers, and 100 Loyal North Lancashires.  The mounted men included 5th Imperial Yeomanry (184), Cape Police (233), Cullinan’s Horse (64), 86th Imperial Yeomanry (110), Diamond Fields Horse (92), Dennison’ s Scouts (58), Ashburner’s Horse (126), and British South African Police (24).  Such a collection of samples would be more in place, one would imagine, in a London procession than in an operation which called for discipline and cohesion.  In warfare the half is often greater than the whole, and the presence of a proportion of halfhearted and inexperienced men may be a positive danger to their more capable companions.