ride away, ’that I had made a mistake and been fighting our own men.  They were dressed in our uniforms and some of them wore the tiger-skin, the badge of Damant’s Horse, round their hats.’  The same officer gives an account of the scene on the gun-kopje.  ’The result when we got to the guns was this, gunners all killed except two (both wounded), pom-pom officers and men all killed, maxim all killed, 91st (the gun escort) one officer and one man not hit, all the rest killed or wounded; staff, every officer hit.’  That is what it means to those who are caught in the vortex of the cyclone.  The total loss was about seventy-five.

In this action the Boers, who were under the command of Wessels, delivered their attack with a cleverness and dash which deserved success.  Their stratagem, however, depending as it did upon the use of British uniforms and methods, was illegitimate by all the laws of war, and one can but marvel at the long-suffering patience of officers and men who endured such things without any attempt at retaliation.  There is too much reason to believe also, that considerable brutality was shown by those Boers who carried the kopje, and the very high proportion of killed to wounded among the British who lay there corroborates the statement of the survivors that several were shot at close quarters after all resistance had ceased.

This rough encounter of Tafelkop was followed only four days later by a very much more serious one at Tweefontein, which proved that even after two years of experience we had not yet sufficiently understood the courage and the cunning of our antagonist.  The blockhouse line was being gradually extended from Harrismith to Bethlehem, so as to hold down this turbulent portion of the country.  The Harrismith section had been pushed as far as Tweefontein, which is nine miles west of Elands River Bridge, and here a small force was stationed to cover the workers.  This column consisted of four squadrons of the 4th Imperial Yeomanry, one gun of the 79th battery, and one pom-pom, the whole under the temporary command of Major Williams of the South Staffords, Colonel Firmin being absent.

Knowing that De Wet and his men were in the neighbourhood, the camp of the Yeomen had been pitched in a position which seemed to secure it against attack.  A solitary kopje presented a long slope to the north, while the southern end was precipitous.  The outposts were pushed well out upon the plain, and a line of sentries was placed along the crest.  The only precaution which seems to have been neglected was to have other outposts at the base of the southern declivity.  It appears to have been taken for granted, however, that no attack was to be apprehended from that side, and that in any case it would be impossible to evade the vigilance of the sentries upon the top.