After this one sharp engagement there ensued several weeks during which the absence of historical events, or the presence of the military censor, caused a singular lull in the account of the operations.  With so many small commandos and so many pursuing columns it is extraordinary that there should not have been a constant succession of actions.  That there was not must indicate a sluggishness upon the part of the pursuers, and this sluggishness can only be explained by the condition of their horses.  Every train of thought brings the critic back always to the great horse question, and encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons of the war and in all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning indictment against British foresight, common-sense, and power of organisation.  That the third year of the war should dawn without the British forces having yet got the legs of the Boers, after having penetrated every portion of their country and having the horses of the world on which to draw, is the most amazingly inexplicable point in the whole of this strange campaign.  From the telegram ‘Infantry preferred’ addressed to a nation of rough-riders, down to the failure to secure the excellent horses on the spot, while importing them unfit for use from the ends of the earth, there has been nothing but one long series of blunders in this, the most vital question of all.  Even up to the end, in the Colony the obvious lesson had not yet been learnt that it is better to give 1000 men two horses each, and to let them reach the enemy, than give 2000 men one horse each, with which they can never attain their object.  The chase during two years of the man with two horses by the man with one horse, has been a sight painful to ourselves and ludicrous to others.

In connection with this account of operations within the Colony, there is one episode which occurred in the extreme north-west which will not fit in with this connected narrative, but which will justify the distraction of the reader’s intelligence, for few finer deeds of arms are recorded in the war.  This was the heroic defence of a convoy by the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry.  The convoy was taking food to Griquatown, on the Kimberley side of the seat of war.  The town had been long invested by Conroy, and the inhabitants were in such straits that it was highly necessary to relieve them.  To this end a convoy, two miles long, was despatched under Major Humby of the Irish Yeomanry.  The escort consisted of seventy-five Northumberland Fusiliers, twenty-four local troops, and 100 of the 74th Irish Yeomanry.  Fifteen miles from Griquatown, at a place called Rooikopjes, the convoy was attacked by the enemy several hundred in number.  Two companies of the Irishmen seized the ridge, however, which commanded the wagons, and held it until they were almost exterminated.  The position was covered with bush, and the two parties came to the closest of quarters, the Yeomen refusing to take a backward step, though it was clear that they