The two invasions which have been here described, that of Hertzog in the west and of Kritzinger in the midlands, would appear in themselves to be unimportant military operations, since they were carried out by small bodies of men whose policy was rather to avoid than to overcome resistance.  Their importance, however, is due to the fact that they were really the forerunners of a more important incursion upon the part of De Wet.  The object of these two bands of raiders was to spy out the land, so that on the arrival of the main body all might be ready for that general rising of their kinsmen in the Colony which was the last chance, not of winning, but of prolonging the war.  It must be confessed that, however much their reason might approve of the Government under which they lived, the sentiment of the Cape Dutch had been cruelly, though unavoidably, hurt in the course of the war.  The appearance of so popular a leader as De Wet with a few thousand veterans in the very heart of their country might have stretched their patience to the breaking-point.  Inflamed, as they were, by that racial hatred which had always smouldered, and had now been fanned into a blaze by the speeches of their leaders and by the fictions of their newspapers, they were ripe for mischief, while they had before their eyes an object-lesson of the impotence of our military system in those small bands who had kept the country in a ferment for so long.  All was propitious, therefore, for the attempt which Steyn and De Wet were about to make to carry the war into the enemy’s country.

We last saw De Wet when, after a long chase, he had been headed back from the Orange River, and, winning clear from Knox’s pursuit, had in the third week of December passed successfully through the British cordon between Thabanchu and Ladybrand.  Thence he made his way to Senekal, and proceeded, in spite of the shaking which he had had, to recruit and recuperate in the amazing way which a Boer army has.  There is no force so easy to drive and so difficult to destroy.  The British columns still kept in touch with De Wet, but found it impossible to bring him to an action in the difficult district to which he had withdrawn.  His force had split up into numerous smaller bodies, capable of reuniting at a signal from their leader.  These scattered bodies, mobile as ever, vanished if seriously attacked, while keenly on the alert to pounce upon any British force which might be overpowered before assistance could arrive.  Such an opportunity came to the commando led by Philip Botha, and the result was another petty reverse to the British arms.

Upon January 3rd Colonel White’s small column was pushing north, in co-operation with those of Knox, Pilcher, and the others.  Upon that date it had reached a point just north of Lindley, a district which has never been a fortunate one for the invaders.  A patrol of Kitchener’ s newly raised bodyguard, under Colonel Laing, 120 strong, was sent forward to reconnoitre upon the road from Lindley to Reitz.