Rundle also had put in much hard work in his efforts to control the difficult district in the north-east of the Colony which had been committed to his care.  He traversed in November from north to south the same country which he had already so painfully traversed from south to north.  With occasional small actions he moved about from Vrede to Reitz, and so to Bethlehem and Harrismith.  On him, as on all other commanders, the vicious system of placing small garrisons in the various towns imposed a constant responsibility lest they should be starved or overwhelmed.

The year and the century ended by a small reverse to the British arms in the Transvaal.  This consisted in the capture of a post at Helvetia defended by a detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and by a 4.7 gun.  Lydenburg, being seventy miles off the railway line, had a chain of posts connecting it with the junction at Machadodorp.  These posts were seven in number, ten miles apart, each defended by 250 men.  Of these Helvetia was the second.  The key of the position was a strongly fortified hill about three-quarters of a mile from the headquarter camp, and commanding it.  This post was held by Captain Kirke with forty garrison artillery to work the big gun, and seventy Liverpool infantry.  In spite of the barbed-wire entanglements, the Boers most gallantly rushed this position, and their advance was so rapid, or the garrison so slow, that the place was carried with hardly a shot fired.  Major Cotton, who commanded the main lines, found himself deprived in an instant of nearly half his force and fiercely attacked by a victorious and exultant enemy.  His position was much too extended for the small force at his disposal, and the line of trenches was pierced and enfiladed at many points.  It must be acknowledged that the defences were badly devised—­little barbed wire, frail walls, large loopholes, and the outposts so near the trenches that the assailants could reach them as quickly as the supports.  With the dawn Cotton’s position was serious, if not desperate.  He was not only surrounded, but was commanded from Gun Hill.  Perhaps it would have been wiser if, after being wounded, he had handed over the command to Jones, his junior officer.  A stricken man’s judgement can never be so sound as that of the hale.  However that may be, he came to the conclusion that the position was untenable, and that it was best to prevent further loss of life.  Fifty of the Liverpools were killed and wounded, 200 taken.  No ammunition of the gun was captured, but the Boers were able to get safely away with this humiliating evidence of their victory.  One post, under Captain Wilkinson with forty men, held out with success, and harassed the enemy in their retreat.  As at Dewetsdorp and at Nooitgedacht. the Boers were unable to retain their prisoners, so that the substantial fruits of their enterprise were small, but it forms none the less one more of those incidents which may cause us to respect our enemy and to be critical towards ourselves. [Footnote:  Considering that Major Stapelton Cotton was himself wounded in three places during the action (one of these wounds being in the head), he has had hard measure in being deprived of his commission by a court-martial which sat eight months after the event.  It is to be earnestly hoped that there may be some revision of this severe sentence.]