In the second week of October, General French, with three brigades of cavalry (Dickson’s, Gordon’s, and Mahon’s), started for a cross-country ride from Machadodorp.  Three brigades may seem an imposing force, but the actual numbers did not exceed two strong regiments, or about 1500 sabres in all.  A wing of the Suffolk Regiment went with them.  On October 13th Mahon’s brigade met with a sharp resistance, and lost ten killed and twenty-nine wounded.  On the 14th the force entered Carolina.  On the 16th they lost six killed and twenty wounded, and from the day that they started until they reached Heidelberg on the 27th there was never a day that they could shake themselves clear of their attendant snipers.  The total losses of the force were about ninety killed and wounded, but they brought in sixty prisoners and a large quantity of cattle and stores.  The march had at least the effect of making it clear that the passage of a column of troops encumbered with baggage through a hostile country is an inefficient means for quelling a popular resistance.  Light and mobile parties acting from a central depot were in future to be employed, with greater hopes of success.

Some appreciable proportion of the British losses during this phase of the war arose from railway accidents caused by the persistent tampering with the lines.  In the first ten days of October there were four such mishaps, in which two Sappers, twenty-three of the Guards (Coldstreams), and eighteen of the 66th battery were killed or wounded.  On the last occasion, which occurred on October 10th near Vlakfontein, the reinforcements who came to aid the sufferers were themselves waylaid, and lost twenty, mostly of the Rifle Brigade, killed, wounded, or prisoners.  Hardly a day elapsed that the line was not cut at some point.  The bringing of supplies was complicated by the fact that the Boer women and children were coming more and more into refugee camps, where they had to be fed by the British, and the strange spectacle was frequently seen of Boer snipers killing or wounding the drivers and stokers of the very trains which were bringing up food upon which Boer families were dependent for their lives.  Considering that these tactics were continued for over a year, and that they resulted in the death or mutilation of many hundreds of British officers and men, it is really inexplicable that the British authorities did not employ the means used by all armies under such circumstances—­which is to place hostages upon the trains.  A truckload of Boers behind every engine would have stopped the practice for ever.  Again and again in this war the British have fought with the gloves when their opponents used their knuckles.