The whole series of operations were excellently conceived and carried out.  Putting Colenso on one side, it cannot be denied that General Buller showed considerable power of manoeuvring large bodies of troops.  The withdrawal of the compromised army after Spion Kop, the change of the line of attack at Pieter’s Hill, and the flanking marches in this campaign of Northern Natal, were all very workmanlike achievements.  In this case a position which the Boers had been preparing for months, scored with trenches and topped by heavy artillery, had been rendered untenable by a clever flank movement, the total casualties in the whole affair being less than two hundred killed and wounded.  Natal was cleared of the invader, Buller’s foot was on the high plateau of the Transvaal, and Roberts could count on twenty thousand good men coming up to him from the south-east.  More important than all, the Natal railway was being brought up, and soon the central British Army would depend upon Durban instead of Cape Town for its supplies—­a saving of nearly two-thirds of the distance.  The fugitive Boers made northwards in the Middelburg direction, while Buller advanced to Standerton, which town he continued to occupy until Lord Roberts could send a force down through Heidelberg to join hands with him.  Such was the position of the Natal Field Force at the end of June.  From the west and the south-west British forces were also converging upon the capital.  The indomitable Baden-Powell sought for rest and change of scene after his prolonged trial by harrying the Boers out of Zeerust and Rustenburg.  The forces of Hunter and of Mahon converged upon Potchefstroom, from which, after settling that district, they could be conveyed by rail to Krugersdorp and Johannesburg.

Before briefly recounting the series of events which took place upon the line of communications, the narrative must return to Lord Roberts at Pretoria, and describe the operations which followed his occupation of that city.  In leaving the undefeated forces of the Free State behind him, the British General had unquestionably run a grave risk, and was well aware that his railway communication was in danger of being cut.  By the rapidity of his movements he succeeded in gaining the enemy’s capital before that which he had foreseen came to pass; but if Botha had held him at Pretoria while De Wet struck at him behind, the situation would have been a serious one.  Having once attained his main object, Roberts could receive with equanimity the expected news that De Wet with a mobile force of less than two thousand men had, on June 7th, cut the line at Roodeval to the north of Kroonstad.  Both rail and telegraph were destroyed, and for a few days the army was isolated.  Fortunately there were enough supplies to go on with, and immediate steps were taken to drive away the intruder, though, like a mosquito, he was brushed from one place only to settle upon another.