that the burghers might have peace or might have war, but could not have both simultaneously.  Some examples were made therefore of offending farmhouses, and stock was confiscated where there was evidence of double dealing upon the part of the owner.  In a country where property is a more serious thing than life, these measures, together with more stringent rules about the possession of horses and arms, did much to stamp out the chances of an insurrection in our rear.  The worst sort of peace is an enforced peace, but if that can be established time and justice may do the rest.

The operations which have been here described may be finally summed up in one short paragraph.  A Boer army came south of the British line and besieged a British garrison.  Three British forces, those of French, Rundle, and Ian Hamilton, were despatched to cut it off.  It successfully threaded its way among them and escaped.  It was followed to the northward as far as the town of Winburg, which remained in the British possession.  Lord Roberts had failed in his plan of cutting off De Wet’s army, but, at the expense of many marches and skirmishes, the south-east of the State was cleared of the enemy.

CHAPTER 24.

The siege of mafeking.

This small place, which sprang in the course of a few weeks from obscurity to fame, is situated upon the long line of railway which connects Kimberley in the south with Rhodesia in the north.  In character it resembles one of those western American townlets which possess small present assets but immense aspirations.  In its litter of corrugated-iron roofs, and in the church and the racecourse, which are the first-fruits everywhere of Anglo-Celtic civilisation, one sees the seeds of the great city of the future.  It is the obvious depot for the western Transvaal upon one side, and the starting-point for all attempts upon the Kalahari Desert upon the other.  The Transvaal border runs within a few miles.

It is not clear why the imperial authorities should desire to hold this place, since it has no natural advantages to help the defence, but lies exposed in a widespread plain.  A glance at the map must show that the railway line would surely be cut both to the north and south of the town, and the garrison isolated at a point some two hundred and fifty miles from any reinforcements.  Considering that the Boers could throw any strength of men or guns against the place, it seemed certain that if they seriously desired to take possession of it they could do so.  Under ordinary circumstances any force shut up there was doomed to capture.  But what may have seemed short-sighted policy became the highest wisdom, owing to the extraordinary tenacity and resource of Baden-Powell, the officer in command.  Through his exertions the town acted as a bait to the Boers, and occupied a considerable force in a useless siege at a time when their presence at other seats of war might have proved disastrous to the British cause.