What held Lord Roberts’s hand for some few days after he was ready to strike was the abominable weather.  Rain was falling in sheets, and those who know South African roads, South African mud, and South African drifts will understand how impossible swift military movements are under those circumstances.  But with the first clearing of the clouds the hills to the south and east of Bloemfontein were dotted with our scouts.  Rundle with his 8th division was brought swiftly up from the south, united with Chermside to the east of Reddersberg, and the whole force, numbering 13,000 rifles with thirty guns, advanced upon Dewetsdorp, Rundle, as senior officer, being in command.  As they marched the blue hills of Wepener lined the sky some twenty miles to the south, eloquent to every man of the aim and object of their march.

On April 20th, Rundle as he advanced found a force with artillery across his path to Dewetsdorp.  It is always difficult to calculate the number of hidden men and lurking guns which go to make up a Boer army, but with some knowledge of their total at Wepener it was certain that the force opposed to him must be very inferior to his own.  At Constantia Farm, where he found them in position, it is difficult to imagine that there were more than three thousand men.  Their left flank was their weak point, as a movement on that side would cut them off from Wepener and drive them up towards our main force in the north.  One would have thought that a containing force of three thousand men, and a flanking movement from eight thousand, would have turned them out, as it has turned them out so often before and since.  Yet a long-range action began on Friday, April 20th, and lasted the whole of the 21st, the 22nd, and the 23rd, in which we sustained few losses, but made no impression upon the enemy.  Thirty of the 1st Worcesters wandered at night into the wrong line, and were made prisoners, but with this exception the four days of noisy fighting does not appear to have cost either side fifty casualties.  It is probable that the deliberation with which the operations were conducted was due to Rundle’s instructions to wait until the other forces were in position.  His subsequent movements showed that he was not a General who feared to strike.

On Sunday night (April 22nd) Pole-Carew sallied out from Bloemfontein on a line which would take him round the right flank of the Boers who were facing Rundle.  The Boers had, however, occupied a strong position at Leeuw Kop, which barred his path, so that the Dewetsdorp Boers were covering the Wepener Boers, and being in turn covered by the Boers of Leeuw Kop.  Before anything could be done, they must be swept out of the way.  Pole-Carew is one of those finds which help to compensate us for the war.  Handsome, dashing, debonnaire, he approaches a field of battle as a light-hearted schoolboy approaches a football field.  On this occasion he acted with energy and discretion.  His cavalry threatened the flanks