In the disaster at Reddersberg three of the companies were of the Irish Rifles, and two of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers—­the same unfortunate regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg.  They had been detached from Gatacre’s 3rd Division, the headquarters of which was at Springfontein.  On the abandonment of Thabanchu and the disaster of Sanna’s Post, it was obvious that we should draw in our detached parties to the east; so the five companies were ordered to leave Dewetsdorp, which they were garrisoning, and to get back to the railway line.  Either the order was issued too late, or they were too slow in obeying it, for they were only halfway upon their journey, near the town of Reddersberg, when the enemy came down upon them with five guns.  Without artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a kopje, they took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of succour.  Their assailants seem to have been detached from De Wet’s force in the north, and contained among them many of the victors of Sanna’s Post.  The attack began at 11 A.M. of April 3rd, and all day the men lay among the stones, subjected to the pelt of shell and bullet.  The cover was good, however, and the casualties were not heavy.  The total losses were under fifty killed and wounded.  More serious than the enemy’s fire was the absence of water, save a very limited supply in a cart.  A message was passed through of the dire straits in which they found themselves, and by the late afternoon the news had reached headquarters.  Lord Roberts instantly despatched the Camerons, just arrived from Egypt, to Bethany, which is the nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at Springfontein to take measures to save his compromised detachment.  The telegram should have reached Gatacre early on the evening of the 3rd, and he had collected a force of fifteen hundred men, entrained it, journeyed forty miles up the line, detrained it, and reached Reddersberg, which is ten or twelve miles from the line, by 10.30 next morning.  Already, however, it was too late, and the besieged force, unable to face a second day without water under that burning sun, had laid down their arms.  No doubt the stress of thirst was dreadful, and yet one cannot say that the defence rose to the highest point of resolution.  Knowing that help could not be far off, the garrison should have held on while they could lift a rifle.  If the ammunition was running low, it was bad management which caused it to be shot away too fast.  Captain McWhinnie, who was in command, behaved with the utmost personal gallantry.  Not only the troops but General Gatacre also was involved in the disaster.  Blame may have attached to him for leaving a detachment at Dewetsdorp, and not having a supporting body at Reddersberg upon which it might fall back; but it must be remembered that his total force was small and that he had to cover a long stretch of the lines of communication.  As to General Gatacre’s energy and gallantry it is a by-word in the army; but coming after the Stormberg disaster this fresh mishap to his force made the continuance of his command impossible.  Much sympathy was felt with him in the army, where he was universally liked and respected by officers and men.  He returned to England, and his division was taken over by General Chermside.