If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the relieving army was no less so.  Through the blackest depths of despondency and failure they had struggled to absolute success.  At Colenso they had lost 1200 men, at Spion Kop 1700, at Vaalkranz 400, and now, in this last long-drawn effort, 1600 more.  Their total losses were over 5000 men, more than 20 per cent of the whole army.  Some particular regiments had suffered horribly.  The Dublin and Inniskilling Fusiliers headed the roll of honour with only five officers and 40 per cent of the men left standing.  Next to them the Lancashire Fusiliers and the Royal Lancasters had been the hardest hit.  It speaks well for Buller’s power of winning and holding the confidence of his men that in the face of repulse after repulse the soldiers still went into battle as steadily as ever under his command.

On March 3rd Buller’s force entered Ladysmith in state between the lines of the defenders.  For their heroism the Dublin Fusiliers were put in the van of the procession, and it is told how, as the soldiers who lined the streets saw the five officers and small clump of men, the remains of what had been a strong battalion, realising, for the first time perhaps, what their relief had cost, many sobbed like children.  With cheer after cheer the stream of brave men flowed for hours between banks formed by men as brave.  But for the purposes of war the garrison was useless.  A month of rest and food would be necessary before they could be ready to take the field once more.

So the riddle of the Tugela had at last been solved.  Even now, with all the light which has been shed upon the matter, it is hard to apportion praise and blame.  To the cheerful optimism of Symons must be laid some of the blame of the original entanglement; but man is mortal, and he laid down his life for his mistake.  White, who had been but a week in the country, could not, if he would, alter the main facts of the military situation.  He did his best, committed one or two errors, did brilliantly on one or two points, and finally conducted the defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which are above all praise.  It did not, fortunately, develop into an absolutely desperate affair, like Massena’s defence of Genoa, but a few more weeks would have made it a military tragedy.  He was fortunate in the troops whom he commanded—­half of them old soldiers from India—­[Footnote:  An officer in high command in Ladysmith has told me, as an illustration of the nerve and discipline of the troops, that though false alarms in the Boer trenches were matters of continual occurrence from the beginning to the end of the siege, there was not one single occasion when the British outposts made a mistake.]—­and exceedingly fortunate in his officers, French (in the operations before the siege), Archibald Hunter, Ian Hamilton, Hedworth Lambton, Dick-Cunyngham, Knox, De Courcy Hamilton, and all the other good men and true who stood (as long as they could stand) by his side.  Above all, he was fortunate in his commissariat officers, and it was in the offices of Colonels Ward and Stoneman as much as in the trenches and sangars of Caesar’s Camp that the siege was won.