Our losses had been very heavy, Colonel Thackeray of the Inniskillings, Colonel Sitwell of the Dublins, three majors, twenty officers, and a total of about six hundred out of 1200 actually engaged.  To take such punishment and to remain undemoralised is the supreme test to which troops can be put.  Could the loss have been avoided?  By following the original line of advance from Monte Christo, perhaps, when we should have turned the enemy’s left.  But otherwise no.  The hill was in the way and had to be taken.  In the war game you cannot play without a stake.  You lose and you pay forfeit, and where the game is fair the best player is he who pays with the best grace.  The attack was well prepared, well delivered, and only miscarried on account of the excellence of the defence.  We proved once more what we had proved so often before, that all valour and all discipline will not avail in a frontal attack against brave coolheaded men armed with quick-firing rifles.

While the Irish Brigade assaulted Railway Hill an attack had been made upon the left, which was probably meant as a demonstration to keep the Boers from reinforcing their comrades rather than as an actual attempt upon their lines.  Such as it was, however, it cost the life of at least one brave soldier, for Colonel Thorold, of the Welsh Fusiliers, was among the fallen.  Thorold, Thackeray, and Sitwell in one evening.  Who can say that British colonels have not given their men a lead?

The army was now at a deadlock.  Railway Hill barred the way, and if Hart’s men could not carry it by assault it was hard to say who could.  The 24th found the two armies facing each other at this critical point, the Irishmen still clinging to the slopes of the hill and the Boers lining the top.  Fierce rifle firing broke out between them during the day, but each side was well covered and lay low.  The troops in support suffered somewhat, however, from a random shell fire.  Mr. Winston Churchill has left it upon record that within his own observation three of their shrapnel shells fired at a venture on to the reverse slope of a hill accounted for nineteen men and four horses.  The enemy can never have known how hard those three shells had hit us, and so we may also believe that our artillery fire has often been less futile than it appeared.

General Buller had now realised that it was no mere rearguard action which the Boers were fighting, but that their army was standing doggedly at bay; so he reverted to that flanking movement which, as events showed, should never have been abandoned.  Hart’s Irish Brigade was at present almost the right of the army.  His new plan—­a masterly one—­was to keep Hart pinning the Boers at that point, and to move his centre and left across the river, and then back to envelope the left wing of the enemy.  By this manoeuvre Hart became the extreme left instead of the extreme right, and the Irish Brigade would be the hinge upon which the whole army should turn.