Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not realised that this was the main attack, or it is possible that the intervention of the river made it difficult for them to send reinforcements.  However that may be, it is certain that the task which the British found awaiting them on the 18th proved to be far easier than they had dared to hope.  The honours of the day rested with Hildyard’s English Brigade (East Surrey, West Surrey, West Yorkshires, and 2nd Devons).  In open order and with a rapid advance, taking every advantage of the cover—­which was better than is usual in South African warfare—­they gained the edge of the Monte Christo ridge, and then swiftly cleared the crest.  One at least of the regiments engaged, the Devons, was nerved by the thought that their own first battalion was waiting for them at Ladysmith.  The capture of the hill made the line of trenches which faced Buller untenable, and he was at once able to advance with Barton’s Fusilier Brigade and to take possession of the whole Boer position of Hlangwane and Green Hill.  It was not a great tactical victory, for they had no trophies to show save the worthless debris of the Boer camps.  But it was a very great strategical victory, for it not only gave them the whole south side of the Tugela, but also the means of commanding with their guns a great deal of the north side, including those Colenso trenches which had blocked the way so long.  A hundred and seventy killed and wounded (of whom only fourteen were killed) was a trivial price for such a result.  At last from the captured ridges the exultant troops could see far away the haze which lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the besieged, with hearts beating high with hope, turned their glasses upon the distant mottled patches which told them that their comrades were approaching.

By February 20th the British had firmly established themselves along the whole south bank of the river, Hart’s brigade had occupied Colenso, and the heavy guns had been pushed up to more advanced positions.  The crossing of the river was the next operation, and the question arose where it should be crossed.  The wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would have been infinitely better to have crossed on their extreme left flank, as by an advance upon this line we should have turned their strong Pieters position just as we had already turned their Colenso one.  With an absolutely master card in our hand we refused to play it, and won the game by a more tedious and perilous process.  The assumption seems to have been made (on no other hypothesis can one understand the facts) that the enemy were demoralised and that the positions would not be strongly held.  Our flanking advantage was abandoned and a direct advance was ordered from Colenso, involving a frontal attack upon the Pieters position.