not going well—­indeed, everyone saw that.  I blame myself now for not having done so.  I did not, because, if I did, I should discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops, and, if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the consequences might be very serious.  I must leave it to higher authority whether this argument was a sound one.’  It needs no higher authority than common-sense to say that the argument is an absolutely unsound one.  No consequences could be more serious than that the operations should miscarry and Ladysmith remain unrelieved, and such want of success must in any case discredit Warren in the eyes of his troops.  Besides, a subordinate is not discredited because his chief steps in to conduct a critical operation.  However, these personal controversies may be suffered to remain in that pigeon-hole from which they should never have been drawn.

On account of the crowding of four thousand troops into a space which might have afforded tolerable cover for five hundred the losses in the action were very heavy, not fewer than fifteen hundred being killed, wounded, or missing, the proportion of killed being, on account of the shell fire, abnormally high.  The Lancashire Fusiliers were the heaviest sufferers, and their Colonel Blomfield was wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.  The Royal Lancasters also lost heavily.  Thorneycroft’s had 80 men hit out of 180 engaged.  The Imperial Light Infantry, a raw corps of Rand refugees who were enduring their baptism of fire, lost 130 men.  In officers the losses were particularly heavy, 60 being killed or wounded.  The Boer returns show some 50 killed and 150 wounded, which may not be far from the truth.  Without the shell fire the British losses might not have been much more.

General Buller had lost nearly two thousand men since he had crossed the Tugela, and his purpose was still unfulfilled.  Should he risk the loss of a large part of his force in storming the ridges in front of him, or should he recross the river and try for an easier route elsewhere?  To the surprise and disappointment both of the public and of the army, he chose the latter course, and by January 27th he had fallen back, unmolested by the Boers, to the other side of the Tugela.  It must be confessed that his retreat was admirably conducted, and that it was a military feat to bring his men, his guns, and his stores in safety over a broad river in the face of a victorious enemy.  Stolid and unmoved, his impenetrable demeanour restored serenity and confidence to the angry and disappointed troops.  There might well be heavy hearts among both them and the public.  After a fortnight’s campaign, and the endurance of great losses and hardships, both Ladysmith and her relievers found themselves no better off than when they started.  Buller still held the commanding position of Mount Alice, and this was all that he had to show for such sacrifices and such exertions.  Once more there came a weary pause while Ladysmith, sick with hope deferred, waited gloomily upon half-rations of horse-flesh for the next movement from the South.