plan was a more deeply laid one than had been thought, and that all this business of Potgieter’s Drift was really a demonstration in order to cover the actual crossing which was to be effected at a ford named Trichard’s Drift, five miles to the westward.  Thus, while Lyttelton’s and Coke’s Brigades were ostentatiously attacking Potgieter’s from in front, three other brigades (Hart’s, Woodgate’s, and Hildyard’s) were marched rapidly on the night of the 16th to the real place of crossing, to which Dundonald’s cavalry had already ridden.  There, on the 17th, a pontoon bridge had been erected, and a strong force was thrown over in such a way as to turn the right of the trenches in front of Potgieter’s.  It was admirably planned and excellently carried out, certainly the most strategic movement, if there could he said to have been any strategic movement upon the British side, in the campaign up to that date.  On the 18th the infantry, the cavalry, and most of the guns were safely across without loss of life.  The Boers, however, still retained their formidable internal lines, and the only result of a change of position seemed to be to put them to the trouble of building a new series of those terrible entrenchments at which they had become such experts.  After all the combinations the British were, it is true, upon the right side of the river, but they were considerably further from Ladysmith than when they started.  There are times, however, when twenty miles are less than fourteen, and it was hoped that this might prove to be among them.  But the first step was the most serious one, for right across their front lay the Boer position upon the edge of a lofty plateau, with the high peak of Spion Kop forming the left corner of it.  If once that main ridge could be captured or commanded, it would carry them halfway to the goal.  It was for that essential line of hills that two of the most dogged races upon earth were about to contend.  An immediate advance might have secured the position at once, but, for some reason which is inexplicable, an aimless march to the left was followed by a retirement to the original position of Warren’s division, and so two invaluable days were wasted.  We have the positive assurance of Commandant Edwards, who was Chief of Staff to General Botha, that a vigorous turning movement upon the left would at this time have completely outflanked the Boer position and opened a way to Ladysmith.

A small success, the more welcome for its rarity, came to the British arms on this first day.  Dundonald’s men had been thrown out to cover the left of the infantry advance and to feel for the right of the Boer position.  A strong Boer patrol, caught napping for once, rode into an ambuscade of the irregulars.  Some escaped, some held out most gallantly in a kopje, but the final result was a surrender of twenty-four unwounded prisoners, and the finding of thirteen killed and wounded, including de Mentz, the field-cornet of Heilbron.  Two killed and two wounded were the British losses in this well-managed affair.  Dundonald’s force then took its position upon the extreme left of Warren’s advance.