There appears to have been some idea in the Boer mind that the mere fact that they held a dominant position over the town would soon necessitate the surrender of the army.  At the end of a week they had realised, however, just as the British had, that a siege lay before both.  Their fire upon the town was heavy but not deadly, though it became more effective as the weeks went on.  Their practice at a range of five miles was exceedingly accurate.  At the same time their riflemen became more venturesome, and on Tuesday, November 7th, they made a half-hearted attack upon the Manchesters’ position on the south, which was driven back without difficulty.  On the 9th, however, their attempt was of a more serious and sustained character.  It began with a heavy shell-fire and with a demonstration of rifle-fire from every side, which had for its object the prevention of reinforcements for the true point of danger, which again was Caesar’s Camp at the south.  It is evident that the Boers had from the beginning made up their minds that here lay the key of the position, as the two serious attacks—­that of November 9th and that of January 6th—­were directed upon this point.

The Manchesters at Caesar’s Camp had been reinforced by the 1st battalion 60th Rifles, who held the prolongation of the same ridge, which is called Waggon Hill.  With the dawn it was found that the Boer riflemen were within eight hundred yards, and from then till evening a constant fire was maintained upon the hill.  The Boer, however, save when the odds are all in his favour, is not, in spite of his considerable personal bravery, at his best in attack.  His racial traditions, depending upon the necessity for economy of human life, are all opposed to it.  As a consequence two regiments well posted were able to hold them off all day with a loss which did not exceed thirty killed and wounded, while the enemy, exposed to the shrapnel of the 42nd battery, as well as the rifle-fire of the infantry, must have suffered very much more severely.  The result of the action was a well-grounded belief that in daylight there was very little chance of the Boers being able to carry the lines.  As the date was that of the Prince of Wales’s birthday, a salute of twenty-one shotted naval guns wound up a successful day.

The failure of the attempt upon Ladysmith seems to have convinced the enemy that a waiting game, in which hunger, shell-fire, and disease were their allies, would be surer and less expensive than an open assault.  From their distant hilltops they continued to plague the town, while garrison and citizens sat grimly patient, and learned to endure if not to enjoy the crash of the 96-pound shells, and the patter of shrapnel upon their corrugated-iron roofs.  The supplies were adequate, and the besieged were fortunate in the presence of a first-class organiser, Colonel Ward of Islington fame, who with the assistance of Colonel Stoneman systematised the collection and issue of all the food,