that he shared with others the idea that the Boers were up on the hills, and had no inkling that their front trenches were down at the river.  With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such scouting as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him into a position which cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy for the critic to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed the abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the enemy.  Nor is there any evidence that the loss of these guns did seriously affect the fate of the action, for at those other parts of the field where the infantry had the full and unceasing support of the artillery the result was not more favourable than at the centre.

So much for Colenso.  A more unsatisfactory and in some ways inexplicable action is not to be found in the range of British military history.  And the fuller the light which has been poured upon it, the more extraordinary does the battle appear.  There are a preface and a sequel to the action which have put a severe strain upon the charity which the British public has always shown that it is prepared to extend to a defeated General.  The preface is that General Buller sent word to General White that he proposed to attack upon the 17th, while the actual attack was delivered upon the 15th, so that the garrison was not prepared to make that demonstration which might have prevented the besiegers from sending important reinforcements to Botha, had he needed them.  The sequel is more serious.  Losing all heart at his defeat, General Buller, although he had been officially informed that White had provisions for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the surrender of the garrison.  White’s first reply, which deserves to live with the anecdote of Nelson’s telescope at his blind eye, was to the effect that he believed the enemy had been tampering with Buller’s messages.  To this Buller despatched an amended message, which with Sir George White’s reply, is here appended: 

Message of December 16th, as altered by that of December 17th, 1899.

’I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare.  Can you last so long?

’How many days can you hold out?  I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can, and making best terms you can.  I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in.  I find my infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here.  Whatever happens, recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books, and all deciphered messages.’

From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller.  December 16th, 1899.