But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain that had they not reached them the regiments would have been uselessly destroyed where they lay.  It seems to have been Buller himself, who showed extraordinary and ubiquitous personal energy during the day, that ordered them to fall back.  As they retreated there was an entire absence of haste and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and General Hart—­whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool courage was beyond praise—­had hard work to reform the splendid brigade which six hours before had tramped out of Chieveley Camp.  Between five and six hundred of them had fallen—­a loss which approximates to that of the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein.  The Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest sufferers.

So much for the mishap of the 5th Brigade.  It is superfluous to point out that the same old omissions were responsible for the same old results.  Why were the men in quarter column when advancing against an unseen foe?  Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position of the ford?  Where were the clouds of skirmishers which should precede such an advance?  The recent examples in the field and the teachings of the text-books were equally set at naught, as they had been, and were to be, so often in this campaign.  There may be a science of war in the lecture-rooms at Camberley, but very little of it found its way to the veld.  The slogging valour of the private, the careless dash of the regimental officer—­these were our military assets—­but seldom the care and foresight of our commanders.  It is a thankless task to make such comments, but the one great lesson of the war has been that the army is too vital a thing to fall into the hands of a caste, and that it is a national duty for every man to speak fearlessly and freely what he believes to be the truth.

Passing from the misadventure of the 5th Brigade we come as we move from left to right upon the 4th, or Lyttelton’s Brigade, which was instructed not to attack itself but to support the attack on either side of it.  With the help of the naval guns it did what it could to extricate and cover the retreat of the Irishmen, but it could play no very important part in the action, and its losses were insignificant.  On its right in turn Hildyard’s English Brigade had developed its attack upon Colenso and the bridge.  The regiments under Hildyard’s lead were the 2nd West Surrey, the 2nd Devons (whose first battalion was doing so well with the Ladysmith force), the East Surreys, and the West Yorkshires.  The enemy had evidently anticipated the main attack on this position, and not only were the trenches upon the other side exceptionally strong, but their artillery converged upon the bridge, at least a dozen heavy pieces, besides a number of quick-firers, bearing upon it.  The Devons and the Queens, in open order (an extended line of khaki dots, blending so admirably with the