Question.  “If such facts as Roberton’s cases were before you, and the attendant had had ten, or even five fatal cases, or three, or two even, would you, or would you not, if insuring the life of the next patient to be taken care of by that attendant, expect an extra premium over that of an average case of childbirth?”

Answer.  “Of course I should require a very large extra premium, if I would take take risk at all.”

But I do not choose to add the expressions of indignation which the examination of the facts before him called out.  I was satisfied from the effect they produced on him, that if all the hideous catalogues of cases now accumulated were fully brought to the knowledge of the public, nothing, since the days of Burke and Hare, has raised such a cry of horror as would be shrieked in the ears of the Profession.

Dr. Meigs has elsewhere invoked “Providence” as the alternative of accident, to account for the “coincidences.” ("Obstetrics,” Phil. 1852, p. 631.) If so, Providence either acts through the agency of secondary causes, as in other diseases, or not.  If through such causes, let us find out what they are, as we try to do in other cases.  It may be true that offences, or diseases, will come, but “woe unto him through whom they come,” if we catch him in the voluntary or careless act of bringing them!  But if Providence does not act through secondary causes in this particular sphere of etiology, then why does Dr. Meigs take such pains to reason so extensively about the laws of contagion, which, on that supposition, have no more to do with this case than with the plague which destroyed the people after David had numbered them?  Above all, what becomes of the theological aspect of the question, when he asserts that a practitioner was “only unlucky in meeting with the epidemic cases?” (Op. cit. p. 633.) We do not deny that the God of battles decides the fate of nations; but we like to have the biggest squadrons on our side, and we are particular that our soldiers should not only say their prayers, but also keep their powder dry.  We do not deny the agency of Providence in the disaster at Norwalk, but we turn off the engineer, and charge the Company five thousand dollars apiece for every life that is sacrificed.

Why a grand jury should not bring in a bill against a physician who switches off a score of women one after the other along his private track, when he knows that there is a black gulf at the end of it, down which they are to plunge, while the great highway is clear, is more than I can answer.  It is not by laying the open draw to Providence that he is to escape the charge of manslaughter.

To finish with all these lesser matters of question, I am unable to see why a female must necessarily be unattended in her confinement, because she declines the services of a particular practitioner.  In all the series of cases mentioned, the death-carrying attendant was surrounded by others not tracked by disease and its consequences.  Which, I would ask, is worse,—­to call in another, even a rival practitioner, or to submit an unsuspecting female to a risk which an Insurance Company would have nothing to do with?