We have no definite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we have than of those we could wish to have.  We may be able to send you some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more.  As you alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he cannot have been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond than Richmond is to come to him.  Neither is very likely.  I think Jackson’s game—­his assigned work—­now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to.  Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there.  Our game is not to allow this.  Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the objects being to guard against Jackson’s returning by the same route to the upper Potomac over which you have just driven him out, and at the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia.

Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead, if, on full consideration, you think best.  I do not believe Jackson will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and if he comes upon you in superior force, you have but to notify us, fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time.  But while we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave no force on the Front Royal line—­the very line upon which he prosecuted his late raid.  The true policy is to place one of you on one line and the other on the other in such positions that you can unite once you actually find Jackson moving upon it.  And this is precisely what we are doing.  This protects that part of our frontier, so to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance of McClellan.  I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it deranged.  While you have only asked for Sigel, I have spoken only of Banks, and this because Sigel’s force is now the principal part of Bank’s force.

About transferring General Schenck’s commands, the purchase of supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers, mentioned in your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War to-morrow.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

Washington, June 16, 1862

Major-general Fremont, Mount Jackson, Virginia: 

Your despatch of yesterday, reminding me of a supposed understanding that I would furnish you a corps of 35,000 men, and asking of me the “fulfilment of this understanding,” is received.  I am ready to come to a fair settlement of accounts with you on the fulfilment of understandings.