In conversation with you on New Year’s morning I was led to express some opinions which I afterward felt it my duty to place on paper, and to express them verbally to the gentleman of whom we were speaking, which I did in your presence, after handing you the letter.  You were not disposed then, as I saw, to retain the letter, and I took it back, but I now return it to you for record if you wish it.

I beg leave to say that my resignation is not sent in in any spirit of insubordination, but, as I before said, simply to relieve you from any embarrassment in changing commanders where lack of confidence may have rendered it necessary.

The bearer of this will bring me any answer, or I should be glad to hear from you by telegraph in cipher.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. Burnside,
Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Headquarters of the army, Washington,
January 7, 1863.

Major-general Burnside, Commanding, etc., Falmouth: 

General:—­Your communication of the 5th was delivered to me by your aide-de-camp at 12 M. to-day.

In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command of the Army of the Potomac I have advised a forward movement across the Rappahannock.  At our interview at Warrenton I urged that you should cross by the fords above Fredericksburg rather than to fall down to that place; and when I left you at Warrenton it was understood that at least a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so represented to the President.  It was this modification of the plan proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval.  When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the enemy’s works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive blow.  I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies and engage him at an advantage.

In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was, not Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee’s army, which threatened Washington and the line of the upper Potomac.  I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I have expressed, and which I still hold.

The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the early part of November.  The chances of an extended line of operations are now, on account of the advanced season, much less than then.  But the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms.