But the mere leaving out is not the most remarkable feature of this most remarkable essay.  His proposition is to establish that the leading men of the Revolution were for his great principle of nonintervention by the government in the question of slavery in the Territories, while history shows that they decided, in the cases actually brought before them, in exactly the contrary way, and he knows it.  Not only did they so decide at that time, but they stuck to it during sixty years, through thick and thin, as long as there was one of the Revolutionary heroes upon the stage of political action.  Through their whole course, from first to last, they clung to freedom.  And now he asks the community to believe that the men of the Revolution were in favor of his great principle, when we have the naked history that they themselves dealt with this very subject matter of his principle, and utterly repudiated his principle, acting upon a precisely contrary ground.  It is as impudent and absurd as if a prosecuting attorney should stand up before a jury and ask them to convict A as the murderer of B, while B was walking alive before them.

I say, again, if judge Douglas asserts that the men of the Revolution acted upon principles by which, to be consistent with themselves, they ought to have adopted his popular sovereignty, then, upon a consideration of his own argument, he had a right to make you believe that they understood the principles of government, but misapplied them, that he has arisen to enlighten the world as to the just application of this principle.  He has a right to try to persuade you that he understands their principles better than they did, and, therefore, he will apply them now, not as they did, but as they ought to have done.  He has a right to go before the community and try to convince them of this, but he has no right to attempt to impose upon any one the belief that these men themselves approved of his great principle.  There are two ways of establishing a proposition.  One is by trying to demonstrate it upon reason, and the other is, to show that great men in former times have thought so and so, and thus to pass it by the weight of pure authority.  Now, if Judge Douglas will demonstrate somehow that this is popular sovereignty,—­the right of one man to make a slave of another, without any right in that other or any one else to object,—­demonstrate it as Euclid demonstrated propositions,—­there is no objection.  But when he comes forward, seeking to carry a principle by bringing to it the authority of men who themselves utterly repudiate that principle, I ask that he shall not be permitted to do it.

I see, in the judge’s speech here, a short sentence in these words:  “Our fathers, when they formed this government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than, we do now.”  That is true; I stick to that.  I will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the bitter end.  And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and truthfully show how they acted, understanding it better than we do.  All I ask of you, Judge Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that the men of the Revolution understood this subject better than we do now, and with that better understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.