What is now combated is the position that secession is consistent with the Constitution—­is lawful and peaceful.  It is not contended that there is any express law for it; and nothing should ever be implied as law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences.  The nation purchased with money the countries out of which several of these States were formed.  Is it just that they shall go off without leave and without refunding?  The nation paid very large sums (in the aggregate, I believe, nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes.  Is it just that she shall now be off without consent or without making any return?  The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States in common with the rest.  Is it just either that creditors shall go unpaid or the remaining States pay the whole?  A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas.  Is it just that she shall leave and pay no part of this herself?

Again, if one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts.  Is this quite just for creditors?  Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money?  If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain.

The seceders insist that our Constitution admits of secession.  They have assumed to make a national constitution of their own, in which of necessity they have either discarded or retained the right of secession as they insist it exists in ours.  If they have discarded it, they thereby admit that on principle it ought not to be in ours.  If they have retained it, by their own construction of ours, they show that to be consistent they must secede from one another whenever they shall find it the easiest way of settling their debts, or effecting any other selfish or unjust object.  The principle itself is one of disintegration and upon which no government can possibly endure.

If all the States save one should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights.  But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called “driving the one out,” should be called “the seceding of the others from that one,” it would be exactly what the seceders claim to do, unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do.  These politicians are subtle and profound on the rights of minorities.  They are not partial to that power which made the Constitution and speaks from the preamble calling itself “We, the People.”