in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson’s letter.  The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion.  On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as before.  He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted.  In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated.  This could not be allowed.  Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced.  This last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity.  An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens.  This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea.  The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter.  The news itself was that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration (and of the existence of which the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops.  To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible—­rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort.  In precaution against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to circumstances.  The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward.  As had been intended in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort.  This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.