I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough for me that I do not intend anything evil in the result, but it is incumbent on me to show that it has not a tendency to that result.  I have met Judge Douglas in that point of view.  I have not only made the declaration that I do not mean to produce a conflict between the States, but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have shown to the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a most peaceful tendency.  The quotation that I happened to make in that Springfield Speech, that “a house divided against itself cannot stand,” and which has proved so offensive to the judge, was part and parcel of the same thing.  He tries to show that variety in the democratic institutions of the different States is necessary and indispensable.  I do not dispute it.  I have no controversy with Judge Douglas about that.  I shall very readily agree with him that it would be foolish for us to insist upon having a cranberry law here in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they have cranberries.  I should insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in us to deny to Virginia the right to enact oyster laws, where they have oysters, because we want no such laws here.  I understand, I hope, quite as well as Judge Douglas or anybody else, that the variety in the soil and climate and face of the country, and consequent variety in the industrial pursuits and productions of a country, require systems of law conforming to this variety in the natural features of the country.  I understand quite as well as Judge Douglas that if we here raise a barrel of flour more than we want, and the Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar more than they want, it is of mutual advantage to exchange.  That produces commerce, brings us together, and makes us better friends.  We like one another the more for it.  And I understand as well as Judge Douglas, or anybody else, that these mutual accommodations are the cements which bind together the different parts of this Union; that instead of being a thing to “divide the house,”—­figuratively expressing the Union,—­they tend to sustain it; they are the props of the house, tending always to hold it up.

But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel between these things and this institution of slavery?  I do not see that there is any parallel at all between them.  Consider it.  When have we had any difficulty or quarrel amongst ourselves about the cranberry laws of Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine-lumber laws of Maine, or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour?  When have we had any quarrels over these things?  When have we had perfect peace in regard to this thing which I say is an element of discord in this Union?  We have sometimes had peace, but when was it?  It was when the institution of slavery remained quiet where it was.  We have had difficulty