I signified in one of my speeches that I should be driven to draw upon whatever of humble resources I might have,—­to adopt a new course with him.  I was not entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with him, but I at least had the purpose made to do as well as I could upon him; and now I say that I will not be the first to cry “Hold.”  I think it originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably will.  But I shall not ask any favors at all.  He asks me, or he asks the audience, if I wish to push this matter to the point of personal difficulty.  I tell him, no.  He did not make a mistake, in one of his early speeches, when he called me an “amiable” man, though perhaps he did when he called me an “intelligent” man.  It really hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged anybody on earth.  I again tell him, no!  I very much prefer, when this canvass shall be over, however it may result, that we at least part without any bitter recollections of personal difficulties.

The Judge, in his concluding speech at Galesburgh, says that I was pushing this matter to a personal difficulty, to avoid the responsibility for the enormity of my principles.  I say to the Judge and this audience, now, that I will again state our principles, as well as I hastily can, in all their enormity, and if the Judge hereafter chooses to confine himself to a war upon these principles, he will probably not find me departing from the same course.

We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery.  It is a matter of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element.  It is the opinion of all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon it, that it is a dangerous element.  We keep up a controversy in regard to it.  That controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion; and if we can learn exactly—­can reduce to the lowest elements—­what that difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for discussing the different systems of policy that we would propose in regard to that disturbing element.  I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest of terms, is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong.  The Republican party think it wrong; we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong.  We think it as a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole nation.  Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong.  We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it.  We have a due regard to the actual presence of it amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and all the constitutional obligations