introduced bills for the purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska Bill, I think you will discover that he did not exactly follow them.  But I do not wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion.  My own opinion is, that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not designed as patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska Bill did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious distinctions between free and slave States.  I am altogether unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the free and slave States.  But there is still a difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this.  I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty; that he is in favor of eradicating, of pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery.  Everything that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy carefully excludes the thought that there is anything wrong in slavery.  All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is anything whatever wrong in slavery.  If you will take the Judge’s speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him,—­as his declaration that he “don’t care whether slavery is voted up or down,”—­you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong.  If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don’t care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down.  Judge Douglas declares that if any community wants slavery they have a right to have it.  He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong.  He insists that upon the score of equality the owners of slaves and owners of property—­of horses and every other sort of property—­should be alike, and hold them alike in a new Territory.  That is perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike and are equally founded in right.  But if you admit that one of them is wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong.  And from this difference of sentiment,—­the belief on the part of one that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong, and this other sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that