very well knew they insisted on that which he would
not for a moment think of doing, and that they were
only bluffing him. I believe (I have not, since
he made his answer, had a chance to examine the journals
or Congressional Globe and therefore speak from memory)—I
believe the state of the bill at that time, according
to parliamentary rules, was such that no member could
propose an additional amendment to Chase’s amendment.
I rather think this is the truth,—the Judge
shakes his head. Very well. I would like
to know, then, if they wanted Chase’s amendment
fixed over, why somebody else could not have offered
to do it? If they wanted it amended, why did
they not offer the amendment? Why did they not
put it in themselves? But to put it on the other
ground: suppose that there was such an amendment
offered, and Chase’s was an amendment to an amendment;
until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you
cannot pile another on. Then all these gentlemen
had to do was to vote Chase’s on, and then,
in the amended form in which the whole stood, add their
own amendment to it, if they wanted to put it in that
shape. This was all they were obliged to do,
and the ayes and noes show that there were thirty-six
who voted it down, against ten who voted in favor
of it. The thirty-six held entire sway and control.
They could in some form or other have put that bill
in the exact shape they wanted. If there was a
rule preventing their amending it at the time, they
could pass that, and then, Chase’s amendment
being merged, put it in the shape they wanted.
They did not choose to do so, but they went into a
quibble with Chase to get him to add what they knew
he would not add, and because he would not, they stand
upon the flimsy pretext for voting down what they argued
was the meaning and intent of their own bill.
They left room thereby for this Dred Scott decision,
which goes very far to make slavery national throughout
the United States.
I pass one or two points I have, because my time will
very soon expire; but I must be allowed to say that
Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did upon one or
two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln, an
insignificant individual like Lincoln,—upon
his ipse dixit charging a conspiracy upon a large
number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court,
and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I
want to say that, in the first place, I have made
no charge of this sort upon my ipse dixit. I
have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it,
and presented it to the understanding of others, saying
what I think it proves, but giving you the means of
judging whether it proves it or not. This is precisely
what I have done. I have not placed it upon my
ipse dixit at all. On this occasion, I wish to
recall his attention to a piece of evidence which I
brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that
he had made substantially the same charge against
substantially the same persons, excluding his dear
self from the category. I ask him to give some