On the 10th my army, resuming its retrograde movement, crossed to the north side of Cedar Creek.  The work of repairing the Manassas Gap branch of the Orange and Alexandria railroad had been begun some days before, out from Washington, and, anticipating that it would be in readiness to transport troops by the time they could reach Piedmont, I directed the Sixth Corps to continue its march toward Front Royal, expecting to return to the Army of the Potomac by that line.  By the 12th, however, my views regarding the reconstruction of this railroad began to prevail, and the work on it was discontinued.  The Sixth Corps, therefore, abandoned that route, and moved toward Ashby’s Gap with the purpose of marching direct to Washington, but on the 13th I recalled it to Cedar Creek, in consequence of the arrival of the enemy’s infantry at Fisher’s Hill, and the receipt, the night before, of the following despatch, which again opened the question of an advance on Gordonsville and Charlottesville: 

(Cipher.)
“Washington, October 12, 1864, 12 M.

“Major-general Sheridan: 

“Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville.  It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.  Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes.  Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent to consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

“H.  W. Halleck, Major-General.”

As it was well known in Washington that the views expressed in the above despatch were counter to my convictions, I was the next day required by the following telegram from Secretary Stanton to repair to that city: 

“Washington, October 13, 1864.

“Major-general Sheridan
(through General Augur)

“If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely desirable.  I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see you first.

“Edwin M. Stanton,
“Secretary of War.”

I got all ready to comply with the terms of Secretary Stanton’s despatch, but in the meantime the enemy appeared in my front in force, with infantry and cavalry, and attacked Colonel Thoburn, who had been pushed out toward Strasburg from Crook’s command, and also Custer’s division of cavalry on the Back road.  As afterward appeared, this attack was made in the belief that all of my troops but Crook’s had gone to Petersburg.  From this demonstration there ensued near Hupp’s Hill a bitter skirmish between Kershaw and Thoburn, and the latter was finally compelled to withdraw to the north bank of Cedar Creek.  Custer gained better results, however, on the Back road, with his usual dash driving the enemy’s cavalry away from his front, Merritt’s division then joining him and remaining on the right.