had compelled the evacuation of Charleston City and Harbor, had utterly broken up all the railroads of South Carolina, and had consumed a vast amount of food and forage, essential to the enemy for the support of his own armies.  We had in mid-winter accomplished the whole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days, averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reached Goldsboro’ with the army in superb order, and the trains almost as fresh as when we had started from Atlanta.

It was manifest to me that we could resume our march, and come within the theatre of General Grant’s field of operations in all April, and that there was no force in existence that could delay our progress, unless General Lee should succeed in eluding General Grant at Petersburg, make junction with General Johnston, and thus united meet me alone; and now that we had effected a junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, I had no fear even of that event.  On reaching Goldsboro, I learned from General Schofield all the details of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of the fight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg.  I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant’s staff, awaiting me, with the general’s letter of February 7th, covering instructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter of March 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville.

These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the events of the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself, to fill out the picture.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi

General:  Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to be of any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions to Schofield and Thomas.  I had informed Schofield by telegraph of the departure of Mahone’s division, south from the Petersburg front.  These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparently went without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have not returned.  I was absent from here when they left.  Just returned yesterday morning from Cape Fear River.  I went there to determine where Schofield’s corps had better go to operate against Wilmington and Goldsboro’.  The instructions with this will inform you of the conclusion arrived at.

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against Wilmington fully determined before we started back; hence the absence of more detailed instructions to him.  He will land one division at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of the river, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with his pontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if he can.  With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this move will drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of the city, either back to their line or away altogether.  There will be a large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to follow up and invest the garrison, if they should go inside.