even to the foot of the bluff.  The chips and twigs flew around lively enough, but we staid up long enough to make sure that the enemy had as many men behind the levee as could get cover.  We saw, also, a line of rifle-pits in the rear, commanding the rear of the levee, and still beyond, winding along the foot of the bluff, a road worn by long use deep into the side-hill, and with the side next us strengthened with a good earthwork, affording a covered line of communication in the rear.  The fire of our men was so well maintained that we were able to see all these things, say a minute or more.  Some of those who ventured were wounded, but those mentioned and myself escaped unhurt.  I advised that men enough to hold the position, once across—­say three hundred—­should make a rush (protected as our lookout had been by a heavy fire) across the sand-bar, and get a footing under the other bank of the bayou, as the nucleus of an attacking force, if General Sherman decided to attack there, or to make a strong diversion if the attack was made at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in front of Morgan.  General A. J. Smith, commanding First and Second Divisions, approved of this.  While returning to General Sherman, I passed along the Second and part of the Third Division.  On the left of the Second I found a new Illinois regiment, high up in numbers, working its way into position.  The colonel, a brave but inexperienced officer, was trying to lead his men according to the popular pictorial idea, viz., riding in advance waving his sword.  I was leading my horse, and taking advantage of such cover as I could find on my course, but this man acted so bravely that I tried to save him.  He did not accept my expostulations with very good grace, but was not rough about it.  While I was begging him to dismount, he waved his sword and advanced.  In a second he was shot, through the chest, and dropped from his horse, plucky to the last.  He died, I was told, within the hour.  Many of the regiments were new and inexperienced, but as a rule behaved well.  The fire along the bayou was severe, but not very fatal, on account of the cover.  I was constantly asked what news from Grant, for from the moment of our arrival in the Yazoo we were in expectation of either hearing his guns in the rear, or of having communication with him.  This encouraged the men greatly, but the long waiting was disappointing, as the enemy was evidently in large force in the plenty of works, and a very strong position.  Careful estimates and available information placed their force at fifteen to twenty thousand men.  I returned to headquarters about the middle of the afternoon, and made my report to the general.  We were busy till after midnight, and again early in the morning of the 29th, in preparing orders for the attack.  These were unusually minute in detail.  It seemed as though no contingency was left unprovided for.  Urgent orders and cautions as to rations and ammunition