told me that on his way up from Savannah that morning he had stopped at Crump’s Landing, and had ordered Lew Wallace’s division to cross over Snake Creek, so as to come up on my right, telling me to look out for him.  He came again just before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day.  He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win.  General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.

About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his staff.  I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me a good many significant inquiries about matters and things generally.  By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained that my right then covered the bridge over Snake Creek by which we had all day been expecting Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left, and so on.  But Buell said he had come up from the landing, and had not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt.  I insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and thought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what was left of Hurlbut’s, W. H. L. Wallace’s, and Prentiss’s divisions, we ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle.  I reckoned that ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and that the enemy’s loss could not be much less.  Buell said that Nelson’s, McCook’s, and Crittendens divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day’s battle.  I argued that with these reenforcements we could sweep the field.  Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,—­and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster.  He did not, of course, understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my map, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it.  He handed it to Major Michler to have it copied, and the original returned to me, which Michler did two or three days after the battle.  Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively.  Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence.