a statesman could do in such a case was to weigh inconveniences
against each other, and carefully to observe which
way the scale leaned. The evil of having regular
soldiers, and the evil of not having them, Somers
set forth and compared in a little treatise, which
was once widely renowned as the Balancing Letter, and
which was admitted, even by the malecontents, to be
an able and plausible composition. He well knew
that mere names exercise a mighty influence on the
public mind; that the most perfect tribunal which
a legislator could construct would be unpopular if
it were called the Star Chamber; that the most judicious
tax which a financier could devise would excite murmurs
if it were called the Shipmoney; and that the words
Standing Army then had to English ears a sound as
unpleasing as either Shipmoney or Star Chamber.
He declared therefore that he abhorred the thought
of a standing army. What he recommended was,
not a standing, but a temporary army, an army of which
Parliament would annually fix the number, an army
for which Parliament would annually frame a military
code, an army which would cease to exist as soon as
either the Lords or the Commons should think that its
services were not needed. From such an army surely
the danger to public liberty could not by wise men
be thought serious. On the other hand, the danger
to which the kingdom would be exposed if all the troops
were disbanded was such as might well disturb the firmest
mind. Suppose a war with the greatest power in
Christendom to break out suddenly, and to find us
without one battalion of regular infantry, without
one squadron of regular cavalry; what disasters might
we not reasonably apprehend? It was idle to say
that a descent could not take place without ample notice,
and that we should have time to raise and discipline
a great force. An absolute prince, whose orders,
given in profound secresy, were promptly obeyed at
once by his captains on the Rhine and on the Scheld,
and by his admirals in the Bay of Biscay and in the
Mediterranean, might be ready to strike a blow long
before we were prepared to parry it. We might
be appalled by learning that ships from widely remote
parts, and troops from widely remote garrisons, had
assembled at a single point within sight of our coast.
To trust to our fleet was to trust to the winds and
the waves. The breeze which was favourable to
the invader might prevent our men of war from standing
out to sea. Only nine years ago this had actually
happened. The Protestant wind, before which the
Dutch armament had run full sail down the Channel,
had driven King James’s navy back into the Thames.
It must then be acknowledged to be not improbable
that the enemy might land. And, if he landed,
what would he find? An open country; a rich country;
provisions everywhere; not a river but which could
be forded; no natural fastnesses such as protect the
fertile plains of Italy; no artificial fastnesses
such as, at every step, impede the progress of a conqueror