seen with an evil eye by those who rose up early and
lay down late in order to furnish him with the means
of indulging in splendour and luxury. Such abuses
it was the especial business of a House of Commons
to correct. What then had the existing House
of Commons done in the way of correction? Absolutely
nothing. In 1690, indeed, while the Civil List
was settling, some sharp speeches had been made.
In 1691, when the Ways and Means were under consideration,
a resolution had been passed so absurdly framed that
it had proved utterly abortive. The nuisance
continued, and would continue while it was a source
of profit to those whose duty was to abate it.
Who could expect faithful and vigilant stewardship
from stewards who had a direct interest in encouraging
the waste which they were employed to check? The
House swarmed with placemen of all kinds, Lords of
the Treasury, Lords of the Admiralty, Commissioners
of Customs, Commissioners of Excise, Commissioners
of Prizes, Tellers, Auditors, Receivers, Paymasters,
Officers of the Mint, Officers of the household, Colonels
of regiments, Captains of men of war, Governors of
forts. We send up to Westminster, it was said,
one of our neighbours, an independent gentleman, in
the full confidence that his feelings and interests
are in perfect accordance with ours. We look
to him to relieve us from every burden except those
burdens without which the public service cannot be
carried on, and which therefore, galling as they are,
we patiently and resolutely bear. But before
he has been a session in Parliament we learn that
he is a Clerk of the Green Cloth or a Yeoman of the
Removing Wardrobe, with a comfortable salary.
Nay, we sometimes learn that he has obtained one of
those places in the Exchequer of which the emoluments
rise and fall with the taxes which we pay. It
would be strange indeed if our interests were safe
in the keeping of a man whose gains consist in a percentage
on our losses. The evil would be greatly diminished
if we had frequent opportunities of considering whether
the powers of our agent ought to be renewed or revoked.
But, as the law stands, it is not impossible that
he may hold those powers twenty or thirty years.
While he lives, and while either the King or the Queen
lives, it is not likely that we shall ever again exercise
our elective franchise, unless there should be a dispute
between the Court and the Parliament. The more
profuse and obsequious a Parliament is, the less likely
it is to give offence to the Court. The worse
our representatives, therefore, the longer we are
likely to be cursed with them.
The outcry was loud. Odious nicknames were given to the Parliament. Sometimes it was the Officers’ Parliament; sometimes it was the Standing Parliament, and was pronounced to be a greater nuisance than even a standing army.
Two specifics for the distempers of the State were strongly recommended, and divided the public favour. One was a law excluding placemen from the House of Commons. The other was a law limiting the duration of Parliaments to three years. In general the Tory reformers preferred a Place Bill, and the Whig reformers a Triennial Bill; but not a few zealous men of both parties were for trying both remedies.