by an increased burden of taxation. A ruler possessing
any degree of humanity, cannot rejoice in a victory
that afflicts his subjects. The victories of the
ancient and well organized republics, enabled them
to fill their treasuries with gold and silver won
from their enemies, to distribute gratuities to the
people, reduce taxation, and by games and solemn festivals,
disseminate universal joy. But the victories
obtained in the times of which we speak, first emptied
the treasury, and then impoverished the people, without
giving the victorious party security from the enemy.
This arose entirely from the disorders inherent in
their mode of warfare; for the vanquished soldiery,
divesting themselves of their accoutrements, and being
neither slain nor detained prisoners, only deferred
a renewed attack on the conqueror, till their leader
had furnished them with arms and horses. Besides
this, both ransom and booty being appropriated by
the troops, the victorious princes could not make use
of them for raising fresh forces, but were compelled
to draw the necessary means from their subjects’
purses, and this was the only result of victory experienced
by the people, except that it diminished the ruler’s
reluctance to such a course, and made him less particular
about his mode of oppressing them. To such a
state had the practice of war been brought by the
sort of soldiery then on foot, that the victor and
the vanquished, when desirous of their services, alike
needed fresh supplies of money; for the one had to
re-equip them, and the other to bribe them; the vanquished
could not fight without being remounted, and the conquerors
would not take the field without a new gratuity.
Hence it followed, that the one derived little advantage
from the victory, and the other was the less injured
by defeat; for the routed party had to be re-equipped,
and the victorious could not pursue his advantage.
From this disorderly and perverse method of procedure,
it arose, that before Niccolo’s defeat became
known throughout Italy, he had again reorganized his
forces, and harassed the enemy with greater vigor than
before. Hence, also, it happened, that after his
disaster at Tenna, he so soon occupied Verona:
that being deprived of his army at Verona, he was
shortly able to appear with a large force in Tuscany;
that being completely defeated at Anghiari, before
he reached Tuscany, he was more powerful in the field
than ever. He was thus enabled to give the duke
of Milan hopes of defending Lombardy, which by his
absence appeared to be lost; for while Niccolo spread
consternation throughout Tuscany, disasters in the
former province so alarmed the duke, that he was afraid
his utter ruin would ensue before Niccolo, whom he
had recalled, could come to his relief, and check
the impetuous progress of the count. Under these
impressions, the duke, to insure by policy that success
which he could not command by arms, had recourse to
remedies, which on similar occasions had frequently