316/1 Brown v.  Foster, 113 Mass. 136.

316/2 Leake, Dig.  Contr. 13, 14, 637; Hunt v.  Livermore, 5 Pick. 395, 397; Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Section 36.

316/3 Leake, Dig.  Contr. 638; Braunstein v.  Accidental Death Ins.  Co., 1 B. & S. 782.

316/4 But cf.  Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/1 Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/2 Bullen & Leake, Prec. of Plead. (3d ed.), 147, “Conditions Precedent.”

319/1 Cf.  Cort v.  Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction Railway Co., 17 Q.B.127.

320/1 Goodman v.  Pocock, 15 Q.B.576 (1850).

325/1 Fisher v.  Mellen, 103 Mass. 503.

325/2 Supra, p. 136.

327/1 Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33.

328/1 See the explanation of Dimech v.  Corlett, 12 Moo.  P.C. 199, in Behn v.  Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 760.

329/1 Behn v.  Burness, 3 B. & S. 751.

329/2 Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Section 28, p. 1000.

329/3 See Lecture VIII.

330/1 Kennedy v.  Panama, &c.  Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B.580, 588; Lyon v.  Bertram, 20 How. 149, 153.  Cf.  Windscheid, Pand., Section 76, nn. 6, 9.

330/2 Windscheid, Pand., Section 76(4).  See, generally, Ibid., nn. 6, 7; Section 78, pp. 206, 207; Section 82, pp. 216 et seq.

331/1 Cr.  Ihering, Geist d.  Roem.  Rechts, Section 48, III. p. 116 (Fr. transl.).

331/2 See, however, the language of Crompton, J. in S.C., I B. & S. 877.  Cf.  Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 479, n. 1, A (c).

331/3 Behn v.  Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 755, 756.

334/1 Cf.  Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v.  Rennie, L.R. 10 C.P. 271.

334/2 Ellen v.  Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

335/1 Contracts (2d Ed.), Section 106, and passim.

336/1 Chanter v.  Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, 404.  Possibly Behn v.  Burness, stated above, might have been dealt with in this way.  The ship tendered was not a ship which had been in the port of Amsterdam at the date of the contract.  It was therefore not such a ship as the contract called for.

336/2 Heyworth v.  Hutchinson, L.R. 2 Q.B.447, criticised in Benj.  Sales (2d ed.), pp. 742 et seq.

336/3 See Thomas v.  Cadwallader, Willes, 496; Langd.  Contr. (2d ed.), Sections 116, 140.  This is put as a case of equivalence by Mr. Langdell (Contr., Section 116); but the above explanation is believed to be the true one.  It will be noticed that this is hardly a true case of condition, but merely a limitation of the scope of the tenant’s promise.  So a covenant to serve as apprentice in a trade, which the other party covenants to teach, can only be performed if the other will teach, and must therefore be limited to that event.  Cf.  Ellen v.  Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

337/1 Langdell, Contracts (2d ed.), Section 127.  Cf.  Roberts v.  Brett, 11 H. L. C. 337.