248/2 Anciens Poetes de la France, (Guessard,) p. 71.

248/3 Page 283; cf. 284, cxviii, et seq., 44, lxix.

249/1 Sohm, Proc. d.  Lex.  Sal., Sections 15, 23-25, tr.  Thevenin, pp. 80, 105, 122.

249/2 Essays in A. S. Law, p. 292.

249/3 Cap.  VIII., Merkel, p. 48.

249/4 Cap.  LXXXIX.  Section 3, Essays in A. S. Law, p. 291.

249/5 Chap.  IV.  Section 16.

250/1 Fitzh.  Abr.  Mainprise, pl. 12 (H. 33 Ed. III.); Staundforde, P.C. 65.

250/2 Abbr.  Plac., p. 343, col 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed. II.

250/3 Jacob, L. D., “Bail.”  Cf.  I Bulstr. 45; .Hawkins, P.C., II. ch. 15, Section 83; Abbr.  Plac., p. 343, col. 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed. II.

250/4 Highmore, Bail, p. 199; Jacob, L. D., “Bail.”  Cf. 2 Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Franc., p. 148.

250/5 Highmore, p. 195.

250/6 Ibid., p. 200.

252/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen.

253/1 II. c. 60, Section 25.  Glanvill’s “justa debendi causa” (Lib.  X. c. 4) seems remote from consideration.

254/1 Y.B. 3 Hen.  VI. 36.

254/2 Y.B. 37 Hen.  VI. 13, pl. 3.

254/3 Y.B. 37 Hen.  VI. 8, pl. 33.

254/4 Glanv., Lib.  X. c. 12; Bract, fol. 400b, Section 10; 22 Ass., pl. 70, fol. 101.

255/1 Essays in A. S. Law, 187.

256/1 I. 45; III. 10.

256/2 Lib.  X. e. 17.  Suit, secta, was the term applied to the persons whose oath the party tendered.

257/1 Lib.  X. c. 12 (Beames, p. 262); c. 8 & c. 5 (Beames, pp. 256, 251); cf.  IV. c. 6, where witnesses are tendered de visu et auditu.  Cf.  Bract., 315 b, Section 6 Fleta, II. c. 63, Section10, p. 137.  It was no doubt true, as Glanvill says, Lib.  X. c. 17, that the usual mode of proof was by a writing or by duel, and that the King’s Court did not generally give protection to private agreements made anywhere except in the Court of the King (Lib.  X. c. 8).  But it can hardly be that debts were never established by witness in his time, in view of the continuous evidence from Bracton onwards.

257/2 But cf.  Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 399.  I do not go so far as to say that they were still a living institution.  However that may be, tradition must at least have modelled itself on what had been the function of the former official body.

257/3 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6; Britt. (Nich.) I. p. 162; Magna Charta, c. 38; Y.B. 21 Ed. I. 456; 7 Ed. II. 242; 18 Ed. II. 582; 3 Bl.  Comm. 295, 344.  Cf. 17 Ed. III. 48 b.

257/4 Cf.  Glanv., Lib.  IV. c. 6.

258/1 Lib.  X. c. 18.  It is possible that this means no more than Glanvill’s often repeated statement, that the King’s Court did not, generally speaking, take cognizance of private agreements.  The substantive law was, perhaps, still limited by traditions from the infancy of contract.  See pp. 248, 251, 259, 260.  The proposition in its broadest form may have been based on the inability to try such agreements in any way but those which have been specified.  Cf. the requirement of aliam diracionationem and aliis probationibus, in Lib.  X. c. 12.  But cf.  Ibid. with Essays in A. S. Law, pp. 189, 190.