In the beginning of the first Lecture it was shown that the appeals of the early law were directed only to intentional wrongs.  The appeal was a far older form of procedure than the indictment, and may be said to have had a criminal as well as a civil aspect.  It had the double object of satisfying the private party for his loss, and the king for the breach of his peace.  On its civil side it was rooted in vengeance.  It was a proceeding to recover those compositions, at first optional, afterwards compulsory, by which a wrong-doer bought the spear from his side.  Whether, so far as concerned the king, it had the same object of vengeance, or was more particularly directed to revenue, does not matter, since the claim of the king did not enlarge the scope of the action.

It would seem to be a fair inference that indictable offences were originally limited in the same way as those which gave rise to an appeal.  For whether the indictment arose by a splitting up of the appeal, or in some other way, the two were closely connected.

An acquittal of the appellee on the merits was a bar to an indictment; and, on the other hand, when an appeal was fairly started, although the appellor might fail to prosecute, or might be defeated by plea, the cause might still be proceeded with on behalf of the king. 1

[40] The presentment, which is the other parent of our criminal procedure, had an origin distinct from the appeal.  If, as has been thought, it was merely the successor of fresh suit and lynch law, 1 this also is the child of vengeance, even more clearly than the other.

The desire for vengeance imports an opinion that its object is actually and personally to blame.  It takes an internal standard, not an objective or external one, and condemns its victim by that.  The question is whether such a standard is still accepted either in this primitive form, or in some more refined development, as is commonly supposed, and as seems not impossible, considering the relative slowness with which the criminal law has improved.

It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.  The argument will be made plain by considering those instances in which, for one reason or another, compensation for a wrong is out of the question.

Thus an act may be of such a kind as to make indemnity impossible by putting an end to the principal sufferer, as in the case of murder or manslaughter.

Again, these and other crimes, like forgery, although directed against an individual, tend to make others feel unsafe, and this general insecurity does not admit of being paid for.

Again, there are cases where there are no means of enforcing indemnity.  In Macaulay’s draft of the Indian Penal Code, breaches of contract for the carriage of passengers, were made criminal.  The palanquin-bearers of India were too poor to pay damages, and yet had to be [41] trusted to carry unprotected women and children through wild and desolate tracts, where their desertion would have placed those under their charge in great danger.