the end of the roll,"&c. 2 It is not justifiable to assume that a contemporary explanation of a new rule had nothing to do with its appearance.  Again, the fact is clear that the assign got the benefit of the warranty to the first grantee, not of a new one to himself, as has been shown, and Bracton’s explanation of how this was worked out falls in with what has been seen of the course of the German and Anglo-Saxon law, and with the pervading thought of the Roman law.  Finally, and most important, the requirement that the assign should be in of the first grantee’s estate has remained a requirement from that day to this.  The fact that the same thing is required in the same words as in prescription goes far to show that the same technical thought has governed both.

I have said, Glanvill’s predecessors probably regarded warranty as an obligation incident to a conveyance, rather than as a contract.  But when it became usual to insert the undertaking to warrant in a deed or charter of feoffment, it lost something of its former isolation as a duty standing by itself, and admitted of being [378] generalized.  It was a promise by deed, and a promise by deed was a covenant. 1 This was a covenant having peculiar consequences attached to it, no doubt.  It differed also in the scope of its obligation from some other covenants, as will be shown hereafter.  But still it was a covenant, and could sometimes be sued on as such.  It was spoken of in the Year Books of Edward III. as a covenant which “falls in the blood,” 2 as distinguished from those where the acquittance fell on the land, and not on the person. 3

The importance of this circumstance lies in the working of the law of warranty upon other covenants which took its place.  When the old actions for land gave way to more modern and speedier forms, warrantors were no longer vouched in to defend, and if a grantee was evicted, damages took the place of a grant of other land.  The ancient warranty disappeared, and was replaced by the covenants which we still find in our deeds, including the covenants for seisin, for right to convey, against incumbrances, for quiet enjoyment, of warranty, and for further assurance.  But the principles on which an assign could have the benefit of these covenants were derived from those which governed warranty, as any one may see by looking at the earlier decisions.

For instance, the question, what was a sufficient assignment to give an assign the benefit of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, was argued and decided on the authority of the old cases of warranty. 4