But the succession which admits a joinder of times is not hereditary succession alone.  In the passage which has been cited Scaevola says that it may be by contract or purchase, as well as by inheritance or will.  It may be singular, as well as universal.  The jurists often mention antithetically universal successions and those confined to a single specific thing.  Ulpian says that a man succeeds to another’s place, whether his succession be universal or to the single object. 1

If further evidence were wanting for the present argument, it would be found in another expression of Ulpian’s.  He speaks of the benefit of joinder as derived from the persona of the grantor.  “He to whom a thing is granted shall have the benefit of joinder from the persona of his grantor.” 2 A benefit cannot be derived from a persona except by sustaining it.

It farther appears pretty plainly from Justinian’s Institutes and the Digest, that the benefit was not extended to purchasers in all cases until a pretty late period. 3

Savigny very nearly expressed the truth when he said, somewhat broadly, that “every accessio, for whatever purpose, presupposes nothing else than a relation of juridical [365] succession between the previous and present possessor.  For succession does not apply to possession by itself.” 1 And I may add, by way of further explanation, that every relation of juridical succession presupposes either an inheritance or a relation to which, so far as it extends, the analogies of the inheritance may be applied.

The way of thinking which led to the accessio or joinder of times is equally visible in other cases.  The time during which a former owner did not use an casement was imputed to the person who had succeeded to his place. 2 The defence that the plaintiff had sold and delivered the thing in controversy was available not only to the purchaser, but to his heirs or to a second purchaser, even before delivery to him, against the successors of the seller, whether universal or only to the thing in question. 3 If one used a way wrongfully as against the predecessor in title, it was wrongful as against the successor, whether by inheritance, purchase, or any other right. 4 The formal oath of a party to an action was conclusive in favor of his successors, universal or singular. 5 Successors by purchase or gift had the [366] benefit of agreements made with the vendor. 1 A multitude of general expressions show that for most purposes, whether of action or defence, the buyer stood in the shoes of the seller, to use the metaphor of our own law. 2 And what is more important than the result, which often might have been reached by other ways, the language and analogies are drawn throughout from the succession to the inheritance.

Thus understood, there could not have been a succession between a person dispossessed of a thing against his will and the wrongful possessor.  Without the element of consent there is no room for the analogy just explained.  Accordingly, it is laid down that there is no joinder of times when the possession is wrongful, 3 and the only enumerated means of succeeding in rem are by will, sale, gift, or some other right.