This the parliamentary leaders found.  The third year of hostilities was drawing to a close; and they had not conquered the King.  They had not obtained even those advantages which they had expected from a policy obviously erroneous in a military point of view.  They had wished to husband their resources.  They now found that in enterprises like theirs, parsimony is the worst profusion.  They had hoped to effect a reconciliation.  The event taught them that the best way to conciliate is to bring the work of destruction to a speedy termination.  By their moderation many lives and much property had been wasted.  The angry passions which, if the contest had been short, would have died away almost as soon as they appeared, had fixed themselves in the form of deep and lasting hatred.  A military caste had grown up.  Those who had been induced to take up arms by the patriotic feelings of citizens had begun to entertain the professional feelings of soldiers.  Above all, the leaders of the party had forfeited its confidence, If they had, by their valour and abilities, gained a complete victory, their influence might have been sufficient to prevent their associates from abusing it.  It was now necessary to choose more resolute and uncompromising commanders.  Unhappily the illustrious man who alone united in himself all the talents and virtues which the crisis required, who alone could have saved his country from the present dangers without plunging her into others, who alone could have united all the friends of liberty in obedience to his commanding genius and his venerable name, was no more.  Something might still be done.  The Houses might still avert that worst of all evils, the triumphant return of an imperious and unprincipled master.  They might still preserve London from all the horrors of rapine, massacre, and lust.  But their hopes of a victory as spotless as their cause, of a reconciliation which might knit together the hearts of all honest Englishmen for the defence of the public good, of durable tranquillity, of temperate freedom, were buried in the grave of Hampden.

The self-denying ordinance was passed, and the army was remodelled.  These measures were undoubtedly full of danger.  But all that was left to the Parliament was to take the less of two dangers.  And we think that, even if they could have accurately foreseen all that followed, their decision ought to have been the same.  Under any circumstances, we should have preferred Cromwell to Charles.  But there could be no comparison between Cromwell and Charles victorious, Charles restored, Charles enabled to feed fat all the hungry grudges of his smiling rancour and his cringing pride.  The next visit of his Majesty to his faithful Commons would have been more serious than that with which he last honoured them; more serious than that which their own General paid them some years after.  The King would scarce have been content with praying that the Lord would deliver him from Vane, or with pulling Marten by the cloak.  If, by fatal mismanagement, nothing was left to England but a choice of tyrants, the last tyrant whom she should have chosen was Charles.