But the great security, the security without which every other would have been insufficient, was the power of the sword.  This both parties thoroughly understood.  The Parliament insisted on having the command of the militia and the direction of the Irish war.  “By God, not for an hour!” exclaimed the King.  “Keep the militia,” said the Queen, after the defeat of the royal party.  “Keep the militia; that will bring back everything.”  That, by the old constitution, no military authority was lodged in the Parliament, Mr. Hallam has clearly shown.  That it is a species of authority which ought, not to be permanently lodged in large and divided assemblies, must, we think in fairness be conceded.  Opposition, publicity, long discussion, frequent compromise; these are the characteristics of the proceedings of such assemblies.  Unity, secrecy, decision, are the qualities which military arrangements require.  There were, therefore, serious objections to the proposition of the Houses on this subject.  But, on the other hand, to trust such a King, at such a crisis, with the very weapon which, in hands less dangerous, had destroyed so many free constitutions, would have been the extreme of rashness.  The jealousy with which the oligarchy of Venice and the States of Holland regarded their generals and armies induced them perpetually to interfere in matters of which they were incompetent to judge.  This policy secured them against military usurpation, but placed them, under great disadvantages in war.  The uncontrolled power which the King of France exercised over his troops enabled him to conquer his enemies, but enabled him also to oppress his people.  Was there any intermediate course?  None, we confess altogether free from objection.  But on the whole, we conceive that the best measure would have been that which the Parliament over and over proposed, namely, that for a limited time the power of the sword should be left to the two Houses, and that it should revert to the Crown when the constitution should be firmly established, and when the new securities of freedom should be so far strengthened by prescription that it would be difficult to employ even a standing army for the purpose of subverting them.

Mr. Hallam thinks that the dispute might easily have been compromised, by enacting that, the King should have no power to keep a standing army on foot without the consent of Parliament.  He reasons as if the question had been merely theoretical, and as if at that time no army had been wanted.  “The kingdom,” he says, “might have well dispensed, in that age, with any military organisation” Now, we think that Mr. Hallam overlooks the most important circumstance in the whole case.  Ireland was actually in rebellion; and a great expedition would obviously be necessary to reduce that kingdom to obedience.  The Houses had therefore to consider, not at abstract question of law, but an urgent practical question, directly involving the safety of the state.  They had to consider the expediency of immediately giving a great army to a King who was, at least, as desirous to put down the Parliament of England as to conquer the insurgents of Ireland.